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Abstract: 
 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is among the most troubling Personality Disorders. 
Individuals with the disorder have exaggerated fears of abandonment, distorted self-identity and 
problems in interpersonal relationships, and are prone to self-abuse, suicide ideation and 
attempts, rage and aggression. Furthermore, these individuals have an exceptional aversion to 
admitting that these problematic behaviours are symptomatic of an underlying disorder, and 
therefore in accepting responsibility for their behaviour. Using a Spinozist approach, I analyze 
that we the public share in the responsibility for having a population with BPD. Under the 
guidance of Hasana Sharp’s Politics of Renaturalization, I argue that the individual with BPD 
resists accepting responsibility because she is not completely to blame. Spinoza’s radically 
relational ontology shows that no individual can act without affecting and having been affected 
by the myriad of other beings, especially other humans. We the public share in the blame for 
having a population with BPD, and I argue that admitting so will help the individuals with BPD 
gain self-knowledge and accept their respective share of the responsibility for these problematic 
behaviours. This will serve the best interests of the public by affording more credence and 
adding new voices from these personalities in collective conversation. 
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Introduction: 
“[Borderline Personality Disorder] is due to a transaction where both the individual and 
the environment co-create each other over time with the individual becoming 
progressively more emotionally unregulated and the environment becoming progressively 
more invalidating.” –Marsha Linehan, 2003i  
“I should attempt to treat human vice and folly geometrically... the passions of hatred, 
anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from the necessity and efficacy 
of nature... I shall, therefore, treat the nature and strength of the emotion in exactly the 
same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.” Spinoza, The 
Ethics, Part III introduction 
 
For Spinoza, the boundless totality of Nature is inseparable from every being that exists. 
Since humans, like every other finite being, are both corporeal and ideal in parallel (one is not 
reducible to the other), it does not make sense to operate with the belief that the mind has some 
unique power over the body, as is the case under Cartesian philosophy and psychology that are 
still prevalent today. God, for Spinoza, is nothing but the boundless totality of Nature, a position 
that found him in a lot of trouble in his time. Consequentially, humans are but parts of this 
boundless totality of Nature. Hasana Sharp refers to these principle points as “the twin pillars of 
Spinozism” and explains that for Spinoza, existence is horizontal.ii That is, there can be no 
beings in existence that operate outside of the determinations of Nature, and cause and effect. 
Humans are not exceptional mid-beings between an almighty and watchful God and the beasts of 
the Earth. Humans do not have free will, and are intricately tied to each and every other finite 
being in an affective power relationship. In The Politics of Renaturalization, Hasana Sharp seeks 
to determine the consequences of holding such positions in the social world. In the spirit of this 
“philanthropic posthumanism” exercise, it is my goal consider the consequences of 
renaturalization on a certain problematic population of people with mental disorders, those with 
Borderline Personality Disorder. 
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An oversimplified but still useful analogy for conceptualizing the relationship between 
the physical brain and the mind is that the mind is to the brain what computer software is to 
computer hardware. Perhaps it would be helpful, then, to consider that personality is to the mind 
what applications are to computer software in general. That is, like application-code, personality 
includes sets of instructions to perform useful tasks that extend beyond the scope of basic 
computer functioning. A personal computer may not need particular application software in 
order for it to run its basic programming, but downloading an app is really useful in order to 
open a certain kind of file, for example. Similarly, humans do not need a distinct personality to 
eat, breathe, ensure our hearts are beating etc. But, a distinct, pleasant personality is very useful 
when relating with human and nonhuman others in our world. If it makes sense to conceptualize 
these relations in this way, then personality disorders are not most appropriately analogous to 
malware that is designed to disable the functioning of the computer as a whole. Instead, 
personality disorders are better thought of as wildly out-of-date applications that are not as useful 
as perhaps they once were, and may be more susceptible to malware threats and therefore need 
updating. As complex systems, we are not only subject to the design of the forces of Nature but 
we program and are programmed by the myriad of other finite beings in existence. Who is 
responsible for updating the out-dated systems?  
The politics of renaturalization provides tools to help progress treatment for individuals 
with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). By accepting the role and responsibility of the 
public for having a population with BPD, and recognizing that as a society we too have BPD, we 
might help individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder to accept their own due personal 
responsibility. In doing so, the individual with Borderline Personality Disorder becomes more 
likely to be able to fruitfully join in the collective conversation, as we are less likely to exclude 
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them or afford them less credibility. This would thereby facilitate more diverse voices 
contributing to the conversation, both revealing the affects that influence our lives, such that we 
can better understand how reason can moderate these affects, and empowering true ideas by 
having them shared by many distinct individuals. ‘Affects’, for Spinoza, are feelings and 
emotions, the most basics being desire/appetite, pleasure and pain.  The affects reflect changes in 
the body, for better or for worse, resulting from an interaction with another body. (EIIIdef3) 
Revealing affects and empowering true ideas both serve our global interests as we can thus move 
closer to an ideal world of harmony and plenitude, rather than the contemporary world of conflict 
and lack. Accepting a bounded-responsibility benefits those individual with Borderline 
Personality Disorder by easing the discomfort of self-incomprehensibility, as well as the 
experience of being included and affording these individuals with more credibility in the 
conversation. Accepting responsibility benefits those people close to someone with BPD, who 
have yet another way to try and best communicate and cooperate with their loved one with BPD. 
Finally, accepting the societal responsibility for having a population with BPD will benefit 
society by appropriately permitting these bright, and diverse voices to speak, revealing how these 
individuals have been affected by others and how they affect others. This could lead to helping to 
prevent emotionally vulnerable others from being so disordered via developing treatment ideas 
(like Marsha Linehan), philanthropy and activism (like Princess Diana) and sharing and 
illuminating the public about the intimate realities of having a Borderline Personality Disorder 
(like author Susanna Kaysen). By investigating the role of responsibility under the lens of 
Sharp’s politics of renaturalization, it becomes clear that finite beings are intricately related to 
one another such that no one can act without affecting of having been affected by another cause. 
A consequence of the politics of renaturalization is that as a group of corporeally similar beings, 
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we hold some of the responsibility for having members of our population afflicted with 
borderline personality disorder. Another way to put it is that as a group we hold some of the 
responsibility for members of our population behaving in ways symptomatic of borderline 
personality disorder because we all share a common good.  
In Chapter One, I explain the difference between a disordered personality and healthy 
personalities. I will then introduce the 10 personality disorders as listed in the American 
Psychiatric Associations guide the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (DSM-IV-TR) and how 
these 10 disorders are currently classified. Attachment theory is reviewed in a discussion of 
theoretical explanations for personality disorders, thereby illustrating the effects of early 
childhood experiences, and early models for interpersonal relationships. I will briefly touch on 
the DSM revision, issues with the categorical model and hopes for the future. I then go into more 
depth on one of the troubling disorders, Borderline Personality Disorder analyzing the four 
categories in life where these individuals have the most difficulty; 1) emotional dysregulation 
(i.e. emotional responses that are poorly modulated and differ significantly from social 
convention) 2) impulsivity 3) impaired perception and reasoning and 4) markedly disturbed 
relationships; so as to illustrate the complexity of this disabling condition.  
 In Chapter Two, Spinoza’s basic ontology is introduced, describing his notion of 
Substance, Attributes and Modes, as well as the pivotal role of the conatus and the affects. 
Hasana Sharp’s interpretation of Spinoza’s ontology is then explored. Sharp’s goal in Spinoza 
and the Politics of Renaturalization is to provide an alternative and radically relational 
psychology to avoid the traps of what she refers to as “the antinomian dialectic”. The antinomian 
dialectic refers to the pull of the idea that the human mind has a unique power over the human 
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body, that we are somehow exceptional from the rest of Nature, and the counterpull of the 
opposing extreme that we ought to look toward nonhuman animals for models of appropriate 
human behaviour.  I then focus on Sharp’s arguments regarding the freedom of speech, and the 
ecosystem of ideas to show why it is in our best interests as individuals and as a society of 
humans to bring together as many others as possible to engage in collective conversation.  
 Finally, in the spirit of Sharp’s project of renaturalization, Chapter Three describes how 
we are all responsible (within limits) as a society for having a population with Borderline 
Personality Disorder, and I hypothesize that accepting this responsibility will afford individuals 
with Borderline Personality Disorder to free themselves from their defensive blaming stance so 
as to be more welcome in this collective conversation. In so doing, the individual with 
Borderline Personality Disorder benefits by having the stress of self-incomprehensibility eased, 
the significant others in the disordered individual’s life (whom I will refer to herein as significant 
others), and human society at large. 
 A note about terminology: When referencing these individuals, I will not use the term 
“the borderline” out of respect for the unique experiences of individuals who are diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder. Instead, I will use a variant of “the individual with Borderline 
Personality Disorder”. 
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Chapter One: 
Personality Disorders General: 
Many personality theorists agree that we are born pre-programmed with a temperamentiii: 
a psychological-biological based emotional and behavioural disposition to act in predictable 
ways. Personalities are elaborate, cognitive level constructs that encompass ways of thinking 
about the self and others, commonly used coping mechanisms and dispositions to experience 
certain emotions.iv  When a personality characteristic is typically displayed over time and across 
various contexts, the features are called “personality traits”. One’s personality is described by the 
combination of these traits. Patterns of highly maladaptive personality traits are known as 
personality disorders. According to the DSM-IV-TR, personality traits are “enduring patterns of 
perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a 
wide range of social and personal contexts”.v People with personality disorders typically have 
personalities that are more rigid and inflexible across various contexts, and are more likely to be 
characterized by a single trait. Personality disorders are characterized by “an enduring pattern of 
inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s 
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable 
overtime, and leads to distress or impairment.”vi These individuals have chronic impairments in 
their sense of self, and with interpersonal relationships.vii For a diagnosis of an Axis I mental 
disorder such as major depressive disorder, or schizophrenia, patients must present to their health 
service provider with subjective distress. This is not the case for certain personality disorder 
diagnoses. In fact, egosyntonicity (believing that one’s symptomatic behaviour is not 
problematic) is feature of several of the personality disorders such as Antisocial Personality 
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Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder and Schizoid Personality Disorder. Individuals with 
these disorders are more prone to arguing that the victims of antisocial behaviour deserve to be 
victimized (in Antisocial Personality Disorder), or that others are responsible for one’s personal 
misbehaviour (in Borderline Personality Disorder), or simply that there is good reason to avoid 
interacting with others (as in Schizoid Personality Disorder). 
The DSM-IV-TR lists six criteria in defining personality disorders. Criterion A states that 
there must be impairments in at least two of the following areas: cognition, emotion, 
interpersonal functioning, or impulse control. Criterion B requires that the pattern of behavior be 
enduring, rigid, and consistent in a variety of contexts. Criterion C requires that the behavior lead 
to clinically significant distress. Clinically significant distress is not the same as subjective 
distress; what the American Psychiatric Association argues is a symptom of distress, a patient 
may argue is simply life as usual, and that they are not the ones who need to change. Criterion D 
states that the problematic symptoms be stable and present and typically first noticed in 
adolescence. Criterion E states that the behavior cannot be attributed to the presence of another 
mental disorder, nor, as per criterion F, can it be due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (drug abuse, medication, toxic exposure) or a general medical condition. 
 The DSM-IV-TR lists ten personality disorders in three “clusters” based on descriptive 
similarities. The personality disorders in Cluster A are considered odd, or eccentric because 
individuals who have disorders that fit in this cluster tend to fear social relation, and can be prone 
to fantasy and delusions. The disorders in this cluster include the following: Paranoid 
Personality Disorder, which is characterized by a pattern of distrust and suspiciousness. 
Individuals with this diagnosis assume others will harm, exploit or deceive them. This leads to 
reading hidden meanings that are demeaning or threatening into benign remarks or events.viii 
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Those with Schizoid Personality Disorder are detached from social relationships and have a 
restricted range of emotional expression. They prefer mechanical, abstract tasks and seem to be 
oblivious to the normal subtleties of social interactions.ix Schizotypal Personality Disorder is 
characterized by “ideas of reference”: interpreting casual incidents and external events as having 
particular, unusual or specific meaning specifically for this person. People with this disorder are 
anxious in social situations because of suspiciousness and distrust.  Cluster B disorders are 
characterized by their dramatic and emotional qualities. The personality disorders in Cluster B 
include the following: Antisocial Personality Disorder is characterized by a pattern of disregard 
for, and violation of the rights of others. This is demonstrated in aggression toward people, 
cruelty toward animals, destruction of property, and deceitfulness or theft.x Those with a 
Borderline Personality Disorder diagnosis show a pattern of instability in interpersonal 
relationships and self-image. These individuals fear abandonment, are hypersensitive to their 
environments and are known for their explosive anger. Other notable characteristics include self-
mutilating behaviours (i.e., scratching, or burning their skin, bulimia etc), and suicidal ideation, 
or history of suicide attempts.xi Excessive emotionality and attention seeking characterize 
Histrionic Personality Disorder. These people are extremely uncomfortable when not the center 
of attention, and will go to great lengths to achieve their goal (by making up stories or throwing a 
tantrum to make a scene, for example).xii Finally, the individual with Narcissistic Personality 
Disorder overestimate their abilities and inflate their accomplishments. They are preoccupied 
with fantasies of unlimited success and power, and require excessive admiration. They are also 
known for their extremely fragile self-esteem.xiii The Cluster C disorders share a common fearful 
or anxious quality. The personality disorders in this cluster include the following: Avoidant 
Personality Disorder is characterized by a pattern of social inhibition coupled with feels of 
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inadequacy. Persons with this disorder are intensely anxious in social interactions due to fears of 
criticism, disapproval or rejection. They have a low threshold for detecting criticism, disapproval 
and rejection, and therefore more likely to interpret benign event as negative.xiv Someone with a 
pattern of submissive, clingy behaviour related to an excessive need for caregiving, above and 
beyond that which is age and/or situation appropriate, would likely meet the criteria for a 
Dependent personality disorder diagnosis.xv  Obsessive-Compulsive personality disorder is 
characterized by a preoccupation with rules, trivial detail, procedures, lists, schedules or forms to 
the extent that the major point of the activity is lost.xvi  Finally, outside of the cluster system is 
Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, which can be diagnosed based on one of two 
criteria: either the individual presents with a personality patterns that meets the general criteria of 
a personality disorder, has traits for several different personality disorders, but does not meet the 
criteria for any one of the personality disorders, or; their personality meets the general criteria of 
a personality disorder, but the person is considered to have a personality disorder that is not 
included in the DSM Classification (e.g. passive aggressive personality disorder).xvii 
Comparisons of prevalence data from the United States and Europe suggest that 
approximately one person in every ten meets the standard for a personality disorder diagnosis.xviii 
Persons more at risk of developing a personality disorder include those of Indigenous descent, 
African and Black Americans, and other historically marginalized groups, such as those with a 
low socio-economic status.xix  
Precise causes of personality disorders are largely unknown. Like the mental disorders, 
many personality disorders show familial pattern. That is, often a person is more likely to 
develop a personality disorder if a relative (especially first-degree relatives) also meets the 
criteria for having a personality or mental disorder.xx Researchers have investigated the possible 
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hereditary component to the development of a personality disorder. A 2001 monozygotic and 
dizygotic twin study found that if one twin qualified for a personality disorder diagnosis, then the 
likelihood of the other twin also meeting the criteria for a personality disorder was between 50-
81%.xxi A 2012 twin study supports this high probability by concluding that genetics are a more 
accurate predictor of personality disorders than strictly environmental factors.xxii   
Attachment Theory: 
Still, one’s environment still plays an important role in the development of personality 
disorder. There are clear links between those individuals diagnosed with a personality disorder 
and individuals who have had an abusive or otherwise traumatic childhood, and attachment 
theorists agree that these behavioural links are rooted in early childhood relationships. 
Attachment theory maintains that the parent-child bond serves as a template for all later 
relationships.xxiii  It has been demonstrated that if parent-child attachments are poor, then 
children will typically be ambivalent, fearful, or avoidant when relating to others as an adult. 
When this parent-child bond is strong, then the child tends to develop a healthy social skill-set 
necessary to effectively relate with others.xxiv Much of the criteria for personality disorder 
diagnosis relies on impairments in interpersonal functioning, whether the individuals who were 
overly dependent on others, highly avoidant of others, or vacillating between idealizing and 
vilifying others. If these impairments are rooted in poor attachment bonds with parents, it is 
plausible that such poor child-parent bonds are a cause of a disordered personality made manifest 
via inappropriate interpersonal functioning. Bowlby (1970) argued that the ways in which the 
primary caregiver responds to what he calls “proximity-seeking behaviour” (such as crying, 
throwing a tantrum etc) impacts one’s beliefs about one’s own worthiness, and competence, and 
one’s expectations about others.xxv There are four categories of attachment patterns present in 
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adults: secure, preoccupied, dismissing and fearful.xxvi Securely attached adults have a positive 
view of themselves and of others; they affirm their self-worth, and expect people to be generally 
good-natured and responsive. It is likely that a securely attached adult experienced her primary-
caregiver as available, responsive, comforting and safe. Preoccupied adults also have a positive 
view of others, however, they feel personally worthless, and frequently offer externally ordered 
definitions of self (e.g. identifying primarily as “Jane’s dad”, or “Frank’s partner”). They likely 
experienced their respective primary caregivers as inconsistently available, or as unreliable in 
times of stress. Adults with a dismissive style of attachment often display an inflated view of 
self, but not always. In some cases, it appears as though the bravado with which a dismissing 
adult describes herself is a defensive front masking a deeper negative self-view. Adults with this 
attachment style are also characterized by their mistrust of others and the world. These features 
are likely the result of perfectionist parenting styles, styles emphasizing personal achievement 
over personality, and/or when the child is routinely indulged and inconsistently corrected. 
Parents who are abusive or rejecting often influence their children to adopt a fearful attachment 
style later in life. This is characterized by a sense of personal unworthiness coupled with the 
expectation that others will be abusive, rejecting, and untrustworthy. Individuals who exhibit 
characteristics from two or more styles of attachment are categorized as having a disorganized 
attachment style.xxvii  
Lyddon & Sherry have used this four-category model to demonstrate the relationships 
between personality disorders and insecure attachment styles.xxviii Parenting styles and 
environmental influences shape us all, but individuals with a genetic vulnerability to developing 
personality traits symptomatic of a personality disorder are especially sensitive to these 
influences.  Personality disorders thought to display preoccupied attachment styles include 
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Dependent, Obsessive Compulsive and Histrionic Personality Disorders. Avoidant Personality 
Disorder uniquely features characteristics from both preoccupied and fearful attachment styles. 
While only Paranoid Personality Disorder displays characteristics from strictly fearful 
attachment style. Personality disorders associated with both a fearful and dismissing attachment 
style include Narcissistic, Schizotypal, and Antisocial Personality Disorders. Schizoid 
Personality Disorder is associated with dismissive attachment style, and those diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder typically qualify as having a disorganized attachment style.xxix  
Through categorizing the personality disorders by their associated attachment styles, 
Lyddon and Sherry categorize the beliefs personality disorder sufferers held about themselves 
and others. Persons with Dependent Personality Disorder have an inadequate, fragile sense of 
self that motivates their belief that need to be taken care of by others. Viewing themselves as 
extremely reliable, persons with Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder struggle with 
interpersonal relationships due to the belief that others expect them to be perfect. Since those 
with Histrionic Personality Disorder operate as though their self-worth comes from the 
attention of others, they are typified by a belief that they are insignificant and unimportant when 
they are alone. Fearfully attached Avoidant Personality disordered individuals feel both that 
they are inadequate, and also have the belief that others ought to be avoided. Paranoid 
Personality Disorder is associated with persons who believe that they are unique and different, 
and that others cannot be trusted. Antisocial Personality Disorder is associated with feeling 
both unlovable and entitled, and that others will never care or have love for them. The 
overzealous confidence that those with Narcissistic Personality Disorder exhibit seems to hide 
an extremely fragile feeling of self-worth. They believe that others expect greatness from them. 
Individuals diagnosed with a Schizotypal Personality Disorder generally complain of feeling 
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like they are ‘self-less’, unworthy because they experience these crises of identity. They expect 
that others will not have good intentions. Those with a Schizoid Personality Disorder have a 
positive, unaffected self-view. However, this positive affect does not transfer to others; they are 
not emotionally responsive to others, nor are they bothered by their solitary lifestyle. Borderline 
Personality Disorder, as characteristic of a disorganized attachment style, has a self-view that 
vacillates between positive and negative, which leads to complaints of profound emptiness. 
Further, persons diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder sometimes hold these 
contradictory beliefs about themselves (‘I’m worthy’, ‘I’m worthless’) at the same time. This 
inconsistency is paralleled in their beliefs about others. For example, on Monday a spouse may 
be glorified as a hero, but on Tuesday the spouse is no longer worthy of the patient’s trust. 
Lyddon & Sherry maintain that when conceptualized in this way, it becomes clear that many of 
the symptomatic behavior displayed by individuals with personality disorders served as survival 
tools, and adaptive strategies for their (often) troubled early life environments. The challenge, for 
these individuals, lies in the fact that these beliefs no longer apply to their current life contexts.xxx  
DSM revision: 
 There are a number of problems with the categorical model of the current DSM. The 
criterion sets for the individual disorders allow for “diagnostic overlap”, which refers to the 
similarity of symptoms in two or more different disorders, without including an explanation for 
their belonging to distinct categories of disorder. The sets also allow for “diagnostic 
comorbidity” which describes the co-occurrence of two or more disorders in one person, again, 
without providing a justification for this phenomenon. Perhaps most concerning, these 
frustrations have made the DSM-IV-TR difficult for clinicians to use when diagnosis and 
planning a course of treatment. 
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The likelihood of gender, cultural, or economic bias when clinicians diagnose personality 
disorders under the current classification is another of the problems prompting calls for its 
revision. Clinicians are required to ensure that a patient’s behaviour is not simply a reflection of 
a foreign cultural standard, nor a societal sub-group standard; nevertheless clear ethnic, socio-
economic and gender biases exist when reviewing prevalence rates under this current 
classification system. Determining whether these differences are the results of a social bias 
inherent within the DSM-IV, or whether they are in fact relevant organic differences across 
gender, ethnic, and socio-economic groups has been wrought with challenges. Abandoning a 
categorical approach for a trait and functionality dimensional approach is likely to help negate 
the effects of any personal social bias as the criteria are less open to interpretation.  
Currently under the categorical approach, the DSM is organized into diagnostic 
categories where a person either meets the conditions for a particular diagnosis, or they do not. 
This method of classification has a number of limitations, especially on the Axis II personality 
disorders. For example, Canadian researcher W.J Livesley argues that even though criterion sets 
have been, and continue to be repeatedly modified, diagnostic overlap (when a number of 
symptoms affecting multiple systems, i.e., cognitive, interpersonal, impulse control etc., are 
features of more than one disorder) continues to be a frustrating problem for clinical 
professionals formulating potential treatment plans. Advocates of the categorical approach must 
also account for the lack of empirical backing for the categorical model, and the failure of 
multivariate studies fail to yield the factors resembling the diagnostic categories.xxxi   Widiger 
&Trull (2007) echo this concern, and argue that the failure of the categorical system has led to 
individuals who can be appropriately diagnosed in more than one category, while there also 
being an excessive amount of diagnoses of “Personality Disorder; Not Otherwise Specified”, 
!!
!
>E
when a person’s symptoms are not adequately represented by one of the diagnostic categories. 
Furthermore, they criticize the traditional approach for its arbitrary and unstable boundaries with 
normal psychological functioning allowing for subthreshold cases. Subthreshold cases involve 
individuals who are clearly suffering, but not meeting the minimum amount of the criteria for an 
appropriate diagnosis, are therefore left with potentially fewer options for relief. The authors 
contend that these troubles are either explained or eliminated if the traditional DSM-IV-TR 
categories where revised as describing overlapping constellations of maladaptive personality 
traits, distributed within the population, rather than distinct diagnostic categories.xxxii Many 
personality theorists argue that personality disorders ought to be conceptualized based a trait 
dimensional approach modeled, for example, via Costa & McCrae’s famous “Big Five” Five-
Factor Model of Personality (Reynolds & Clark 2001, Ball 2001), coupled with measuring 
impairments in personality functioning. The “Big Five” personality traits include (1) openness to 
experience, (2) conscientiousness, (3) extraversion, (4) agreeableness, and (5) neuroticism.xxxiiiA 
trait dimensional approach measures individuals along a scale of these five traits. Participants in 
these measures respond to short descriptions relevant to the Big Five traits by filling in whether 
and to what degree they agree or disagree with the statement. These trait dimensional approaches 
encourage clinicians to consider the full range of symptomatic behavior with which their clients 
present, and not simply those symptoms relevant to a particular diagnosis, thereby alleviating 
many of the frustrations brought on by the DSM-IV-TR’s categorical approach. 
 The DSM has been revised a number of times since its initial publication in 1952. It is 
currently undergoing another revision, due to be published in 2013 in order to make room for the 
ongoing advances in neurology, genetics, the behavioral sciences, and other relevant scientific 
technologies. Members of the APA’s ‘DSM-5 Task Force’ are also working to clarify the 
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boundaries between the various mental disorders, as well as the boundaries between mental 
disorder and healthy psychological functioning. After reviewing the empirical evidence of 
researchers and anecdotal evidence and recommendations from clinicians, the APA has 
abandoned the categorical approach to diagnosing mental and personality disorders, for a trait 
dimensional approach.xxxiv  
Borderline Personality Disorder: 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is an especially problematic personality disorder. 
According to the DSM-IV-TR, between 8% and 10% of individuals with BPD commit suicide, 
and 75% participate in self-mutilation such as cutting. A BPD diagnosis is based on an individual 
presenting with at least five of the following nine criteria from the DSM-IV-TR:  (1) The person 
makes frantic efforts to avoid real, or imagined abandonment; (2) She engages in “splitting”, that 
is, assessments characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation, 
and shows a pattern of unstable relationships; (3) His sense of self, and self-image are confused 
and unstable; (4) She is impulsive in at least 2 areas that are potentially self-damaging. For 
example, she may shoplift; have unsafe sex with multiple partners; binge eat etc; (5) has hinted, 
threatened, or attempted to take his own life. Or, she cuts herself, pulls our her hair or eyelashes 
and eyebrows, and does not let her scars heal, or other self-injurious behaviour;(6) the patient 
describes herself, or is described as hypersensitive and moody. This instability in mood marked 
by “intense episodic dysphoria”, irritability or anxiety lasting no longer than a few days. (7) The 
patient complains of chronic feelings of emptiness, and (8)is chronically angry and occasionally 
experiences episodes of rage ; and (9) especially when facing extreme stress, the patient is 
paranoid, or experiences severe dissociative symptoms.  
!!
!
>G
BPD shares several characteristics with the other personality disorders, especially Anti-
social, Dependent, Histrionic, and Narcissistic Personality Disorders. Like individuals with Anti-
social Personality Disorder (ASPD), individuals with BPD exhibit anger, impulsivity and 
recklessness. People from both groups tend to have similar backgrounds. Unlike BPD, which is 
diagnosed mostly in females, ASPD has a much higher incidence in males. Individuals with 
ASPD, further, do not seem to feel guilty, or are not as deterred by feelings of guilt, and seem to 
lack a conscience. They are also more aggressive and manipulate largely to gain power, not the 
nurturance sought by individuals with BPD. Like persons with Dependent Personality Disorder 
(DPD), individuals with BPD go to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support from 
others, and feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone. However, they can be distinguished from 
persons with DPD by displaying self-destructiveness, rage and affective instability. Individuals 
with a Histrionic Personality Disorder (HPD) diagnosis have rapidly changing, excessive 
emotions, like persons with BPD, and also share the tendency for self-dramatization and 
charming seductiveness. However, persons with HPD are less angry, and less self-destructive 
than persons with BPD. Excessive rage, a sense of entitlement and an intense sensitivity to 
criticism (real or perceived) are the common attributes between Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
(NPD) and BPD. Absent in the person with BPD is a sense of superiority accompanying 
entitlement. xxxv  
The precise causes of BPD, like the causes of the other personality disorders, are unclear 
and varied. Currently, some of the best explanation of the causes of BPD hypothesizes that an 
individual is born with particular genetic vulnerabilities and tendencies for symptomatic 
behavior coupled with environmental factors that influence genetic expression and determine 
whether this individual exhibits any BPD symptoms. There is a clear heritable component to 
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several of the key characteristics of BPD, especially in affective instability and impulsivity, as 
demonstrated by twin studies.xxxvi Similarly, many individuals with BPD have first-degree 
relatives with “impulsive disorders” such as anti-social personality disorder, or substance abuse 
disorders.xxxvii Brain-imaging studies have suggested that persons with BPD show abnormalities 
in the size of the hippocampus (area of the brain thought to deal with memory and spatial 
navigation) and the amygdala (part of the brain thought to deal with emotional and social 
learning)xxxviii, but the precise nature of this correlation has yet to be determined.  Other studies 
suggest that abnormal levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin (which plays a role in mood, 
appetite and sleep) accompany the increased impulsivity and aggression, and that this sensitivity 
is especially pronounced in women.xxxix Researchers have also looked into the connection 
between autoimmune disorder inflammation and BPD.xl Environmental risk factors include 
traumatic events in childhood such as early separation from one or both parents, repeated 
emotional, physical or sexual abuse, and inconsistent, invalidating or unsupportive care. 
However, it is important to note that not all individuals with a BPD diagnosis report such trauma 
in childhood, and community studies show that many individuals who have suffered such 
traumas in childhood do not develop BPD.  
 The frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment uniquely characterize this 
personality type, and the erratic, often baffling moods typical of persons with BPD stem from 
this overwhelming anxiety. These characteristic symptoms are commonly grouped under one of 
four categories: affective, impulsive, interpersonal and cognitive.  
Characteristic Symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder: 
!!
!
>K
Researchers typically group the key symptoms of borderline personality disorder into 
between 3-5 behavioral dimensions.xli For the purposes of this discussion, I will adopt a 4 
behavioral dimension model, and aim to shine a light on the complexities of these personalities. 
 1) Emotional dysregulation: People with borderline personality disorder differ dramatically in 
their ability to control their emotions and moods, not just from the non-clinical population, but 
also from people with other mood disorders. This is marked by affective instability, the extreme 
and frequent changes in mood. Affective instability has been shown to be the strongest and most 
consistent predictor of troubling symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder over time.xlii 
Individuals with borderline personalities tend to be hypersensitive, which results in a remarkable 
empathy for others, and is often the source of much of the expression of charity and creativity 
they tend to exhibit. But this hypersensitivity also lowers the threshold for tolerating stress, and 
is often the reason those with BPD are easily overwhelmed and perhaps why it takes them longer 
to calm down.xliii Hypersensitivity may be a reason people with borderline personality disorder 
experience frequent or even chronic anxiety. This chronic anxiety is experienced by the 
borderline as a constant nervousness, tenseness, tightness and agitation. It is also a contributing 
factor to the physical complaints often present people with BPD including irritable bowel 
syndrome, migraine headaches, and insomnia.xliv Chronic and pervasive shame is another 
hallmark emotion for people with bpd, especially women with the disorder.xlv Both anxiety and 
shame have been reported as contributing factors in the triggering of a sudden episode of 
extreme rage. Interestingly, it has also been posited that the anger felt by a borderline personality 
is chronic and pervasive, much like their experiences of anxiety and shame, and it is only when it 
is hampered neither by anxiety nor shame that the anger is inappropriately intense, and difficult 
to control. The individual with borderline personality disorder may feel angry nearly all of the 
!!
!
DC
time, and this can be reflected in their behaviours. Often, people with the disorder are resentful, 
grumpy, irritable, sarcastic and short tempered, or else their anger is suppressed out of the fear of 
rejection, or shame.  
When anger is suppressed, the person with borderline personality disorder is vulnerable 
to victimization, as they become “hyper-people-pleasers”. During episodes of extreme 
suppression, and due to fears of abandonment, an individual with borderline personality disorder 
gladly pays whatever the personal cost to sustain an important social connection, even if it means 
a one-way relationship where she is the only one giving, and the friend is the only one receiving. 
For example, after experiencing the thrill of connection and all that it means for the identity of 
the borderline individual, he lends money excessively to his new colleague at work such that he 
can no longer afford to pay his rent without dipping into debt, but it does not stop him from 
lending more money. These behaviours are learned responses from childhood. In households 
where there is little consistency with regard to discipline, and/or if the child has been abused, 
personalities prone to high reactivity learn to do whatever it takes to avoid the pain of 
punishment (whatever that meant in the particular household-physical discipline, a care-giver 
threatening to leave or give up the child for adoption), even if it means putting up with some 
suffering in the meantime. These individuals take the phrase “no pain, no gain” seriously when it 
comes to their relationships. 
 The anger someone with borderline personality disorder feels is pervasive and chronic, 
but the same is not true of his or her infamous episodes of rage, which are context related. It has 
been noted in the DSM that these furious episodes are precipitated by the experience of an 
important person perceived as “uncaring, withholding, neglectful, abandoning”xlvi coupled with 
the already nearly constant feeling of frustration from not having ones needs met in the world. 
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Being the object of this rage is a harrowing experience. Once the individual with BPD is in a 
rage, it will take her longer than others to calm down again. So, even if the situation arousing the 
outburst is corrected, the intense rage remains. Frustrated now that she cannot be soothed, even 
when the problem is solved, her anger, shame and anxiety and compounded into a seemingly 
tireless circuit of fury. Until the storm has passed, either through physical exhaustion, or a 
helpful substance, the person with BPD and her interlocutor are trapped in a no-win situation. It 
is no surprise that these rages lead to self-destructive behaviours and are ultimately destructive 
the relationship.  
Chronic feelings of emptiness further characterize the emotional dysregulation inherent in 
borderline personality disorder. Describing the experience of emptiness for a borderline 
personality has been a challenge for researchers and personality disorder theorists, and it seems 
to be a particular challenge to describe for people with the disorder too.xlvii The experience is 
similar to feelings of boredom, alienation, meaninglessness, and loneliness, which result in an 
underlying feeling of dissatisfaction with one’s life, and an intense seriousness that is out of 
proportion. Famed BPD researchers and authors Jerold J. Kreisman, and Hal Straus offer case 
studies featuring stories of people with borderline personality disorder in Sometimes I Act 
Crazy: Living with Borderline Personality Disorder(2004). The experience of emptiness 
described in these case studies demonstrates that it feels like the individual who is suffering has 
within them a bottomless pit. It is described as unbearablexlviii and like being in a prisonxlix. It has 
been likened to what it must feels like for the abyss to gaze into you, referencing Nietzsche 
famous parable: "Battle not with monsters, lest ye become a monster, and if you gaze into the 
abyss, the abyss gazes also into you" from “Beyond Good and Evill 
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 (2) Impulsivity Due to the physical threats common to behaviours associated with 
impulsivity, this group of behavioral symptoms accounts for the most destructive and threatening 
aspects of this disorder. For someone with Borderline Personality Disorder, indulging in 
impulsive behaviours is typically destructive-to themselves, to significant others and to society 
as a whole. They may engage in binge drinking or eating, reckless spending or gamble too much. 
They may engage in acts of physical or verbal aggression, or engage in unsafe sex with a number 
of different partners. They may shoplift, damage property or drive recklessly just for a thrill. 
Impulsivity is seen especially in patients who have also been physically or sexually abused as 
children. Although a persistent feature of the disorder, longitudinal studies have demonstrated 
that older individuals with bpd are less impulsive than younger individuals with the disorder.li 
Whether this shows simply that the younger have more energy to expend than the older, or 
whether the older individuals have developed new and healthier coping mechanisms for their 
anger, shame and anxiety is unclear. Without a doubt the characteristic of Borderline Personality 
Disorder that most horrifies those without the disorder recurrent suicidal gestures, threats and 
self-injurious behaviour highlight the very real dangers of having this disordered personality. 
Overdosing on purpose, intentionally cutting or burning one’s skin, trichotillomania (i.e. pulling 
out eyebrows, eyelashes and hair), suicidal ideation and other self-mutilations are often 
stigmatized as being attention seeking, but much like every other key symptom the individual’s 
reasons   more complicated that mere attention seeking. Often these desperate acts are coping 
mechanisms to handle the intense distress they can no longer tolerate. Self-mutilation also helps 
provide the individual a sense of control in their own lives, and can help the feelings of 
dissociation and depersonalization that sometimes accompany periods of extreme stress.  
Humans in distress are not unique in this unexpected coping mechanism, it is also seen in 
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animals in captivity.liiSo, though baffling to those who have not felt this particular kind of 
intolerable captivity to one’s distress, it is not an unheard of response in the animal kingdom. 
Nevertheless, if severe cognitive and developmental disabilities are ruled out, and the patient is 
not psychotic at the time, self-mutilation is almost a sure indicator of borderline personality 
disorder. What may have begun as a spontaneous method of relieving extreme stress can quickly 
turn into an addiction as the endorphins produced during a self-injurious event have an opiate 
effect causing relief from pain (both physical and emotional), and a sense of euphoria. The next 
time the individual experiences this kind of extreme distress, she may crave the rush of 
endorphins and euphoria that helped to relieve her pain last time, and engage in self-mutilation, 
thus creating another seemingly insurmountable obstacle to wellness. The dangers of these 
coping mechanisms land individuals with BPD frequently in the emergency room of their local 
hospital, and are typically treated as burdens to the already overtaxed medical systems. Both 
long-term and short-term stays in the psychiatric ward prove to be unhelpful, even detrimental to 
borderline personalities who engage in these self-mutilations. Daily outpatient treatments, 
psychotherapy, and psychopharmaceuticals provide better outlooks for these individuals. The 
best treatments for Borderline Personality Disorder focus on reducing these self-injurious 
symptoms and frequent emergency room visits, and when these particular symptoms are 
controlled, the treatment is said to have been a success.liii  Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) 
is one of the best available treatments for BPD, and focuses on a cognitive behaviour style 
therapy, with an emphasis on mindfulness meditation techniques to manage intense emotional 
states. DBT is based on a theory that supposes that the distress leading to problematic behaviours 
like self-abuse stem from persistent cognitive distortions. DBT was developed by Marsha M. 
Linehan (who has since come out as an individual with Borderline Personality Disorder), and it 
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involves a year-long commitment to intense weekly group therapy and individual therapy under 
a team of psychotherapists.liv  
Approximately 10% of individuals with borderline personality disorder commit suicide, 
making Borderline Personality Disorder a potentially fatal condition. There area certain risk 
factors that increase a borderline’s chances of completing a suicide attempt. Those who are 
especially impulsive pose a great risk of completed suicide, even more so if they are using 
uncontrolled drugs or alcohol, or if they have co-morbid mood disorders. And, like many of the 
more dangerous symptoms of the disorder, completed suicide is most common in individuals 
who were physically or sexually abused as children.  
  (3) Impaired Perception and Reasoning: When taxed with intense emotions, even the 
most level-headed individual must work harder to recall important details, make rational 
decisions, and even just to concentrate on the task at hand. As individuals later diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder were faced with constant stress while during their development 
as children, either through a family trauma or simply from being a highly reactive, hypersensitive 
type, their cognitive systems develop in ways that can put these individuals at a disadvantage. 
They may show signs of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and they may experience 
memories in intrusive and emotional flashbacks, rather than just information recall. They 
habitually misperceive neutral statements, and even neutral facial expressions as negative.lv They 
become very suspicious of others due to a history of mistreatment, and this is especially true 
when they perceive the threat of rejection and abandonment.  In extreme stress, people with 
Borderline Personality Disorder may experience auditory or visual hallucinations, such as seeing 
in the corner of your eye bugs crawling up the walls, or hearing a conversation in a silent room. 
Periods of time may pass where the person has no recall as to what had just happened, or what 
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they were just doing, much like the experience commonly had when you find yourself in your 
drive-way at the end of the day but can’t recall the drive home from work. These experiences are 
referred to as dissociative. lvi Depersonalization is closely related to dissociative events, and can 
be described as a feeling that one is not in reality, feeling like a ghost haunting, or like being one 
must be in a movie or a dream.lvii Also not uncommon among people who frequently engage in 
dissociative events and depersonalization is a soothing practice similar to child’s play: the 
individual may imagine fictional characters, or perhaps more aptly, fantasized characters and 
situations from their favourite books, shows etc and incorporate them into their own everyday 
life. Not having a wellspring of healthy social connections and supports, it is not unusual to 
overhear these individuals speak of these characters as though they are best friends-much like a 
young child speaks of his imaginary friend.lviii 
Instability of the individual’s self-image and identity disturbances are other examples of 
impaired cognitive ability in those with Borderline Personality Disorder. They are constantly 
bothered by thought and beliefs saying that they are imposters who have been fooling everyone 
in their lives, and it is only a matter of time until they are exposed.lix For example, often people 
with Borderline Personality Disorder are shown to be highly intelligent, and it is not unusual for 
a pre-borderline child to receive high grades in school. However, she may feel as though she 
doesn’t really deserve the grades, that rather, she is simply the teacher’s pet, and as soon as the 
next pet is chosen, she will be revealed to be as terrible as she feels she must be. She feels a 
sense of lingering inauthenticity. She may be overly flexible in her values and preferences, have 
little self-esteem and be unable to give due credit for past accomplishments.lx For example, when 
she is with her romantic partner, Betty is a staunch animal advocate and passionate vegan, but 
when her friends from work order chicken wings to share at some after-work get-together, Betty 
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has no qualms about enjoying her portion of the wings, and will likely offer to foot the bill. 
Another common sign that the individual experiences identity disturbance is a pattern of 
breaking commitments, like changing majors at the post-secondary level a number of times, 
frequent changes in jobs and housing. They may be quick to enter into new relationships and just 
as quick to leave them just to start a new relationship with somebody else. These people seems 
like they do not have an identity of their own, and this likely stems from an overbearing 
parenting style while they were children, or else having to prematurely adopt an adult role while 
they were children.lxi Individually these qualities may not be indicative of a disordered 
personality, however, if there is a clear pattern of these shifts in attitudes, values and beliefs, it is 
likely that the individual will experience the consequences of a life of instability. 
Psychotherapists treating people with borderline personality disorder often fret with the decision 
of telling the patient about the diagnosis, as these identity problems can be compounded, as is 
discussed in Louis Charland’s A Madness for Identity: Psychiatric Labels, Consumer Autonomy 
and the Perils of the Internet (2004)lxii Charland discusses how once diagnosed, people with BPD 
especially flock to internet forums, chatrooms, weblogs and the like to seek community with 
other individuals with BPD. In some ways this is beneficial, as we will see, individuals with 
BPD have an especially difficult time in interpersonal relationships, so at face value, seeking 
community online seems good for these individuals. However, Charland notes that these forums, 
chatrooms and blogs may serve, instead, as places where people with Borderline Personality 
Disorder can go to indulge their most problematic symptoms to take advantage of the first solid 
identity they may have had. 
(4): Markedly disturbed relationships: Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment: 
There are two horns to the borderline abandonment dilemma. On the one horn: The individual 
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with Borderline Personality Disorder has an extremely intense fear of being abandoned. This 
desperate fear, I contend, is at the heart of all of the symptoms of this disorder. When threatened 
with abandonment, or when recalling a past abandonment, these individuals are most likely to 
engage in impulsive actions, self-mutilate, experience rage, dissociation, depersonalization, and 
panic attacks.lxiii It is as though the life of those with the disorder are motivated entirely by this 
fear. Even a short time apart from a significant other can cause deep feelings and fears of 
abandonment, and set off a wave of maladaptive soothing techniques described above. Often 
these fears have their roots in a traumatic loss or abandonment in childhood, but such a history is 
not necessary. There are clear cases of abandonment, such as when an overwhelmed new mother 
asks her sister to babysit the new baby for an hour, but then boards a plane to another country to 
begin her life anew. She has clearly abandoned her child, and the baby has experienced a case of 
real abandonment. There are also clear cases of imagined abandonment, for example: when he 
doesn’t call or send a text message for a couple of hours, Ben panics and assumes he has been 
abandoned by his partner. When Ben’s partner returns home, Ben rages about his partner’s 
disloyalty and questions his commitment to the relationship. The abandonment Ben perceives 
would be imagined in this case; he was left alone, but he was not abandoned. But there are also 
unclear cases, and this is especially so for somebody who has been diagnosed with Borderline 
Personality Disorder. For example, a person with Borderline Personality Disorder might take it 
to be real abandonment when friendships organically evolve from being deeply close to being 
less close, as when one loses touch with a childhood best friend. But it is not clear that this 
friendship was obligated to continue; friendships change all the time and people typically lose 
touch gradually. So is it really abandonment, or does it just feel like a real abandonment to the 
person with Borderline Personality Disorder, but is in fact an imagined abandonment?  
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On the other horn: People with BPD have an equally intense and desperate fear of engulfment 
i.e. losing their individuality and fear of rejection that result in the person with BPD isolating 
himself from his social world. Having an unstable identity, individuals with BPD cling to 
fragments of their identity. They may be overly rigid in ways that do not cohere with other 
aspects of their lives. For example, a student with Borderline Personality Disorder may have a 
rule to always sit in one spot during her Philosophy class, and when someone else takes her spot, 
the otherwise (possibly) over-friendly, people-pleasing individual who is phobic of social 
rejection may react curtly, barking that the seat belongs to her. The once idealistic image of this 
seat-taker that the individual with BPD might have had prior to this encounter is changed to the 
image of a rude, inconsiderate jerk who should respect her (mostly unspoken) rules. Other 
isolating factors are the thoughts and beliefs that stress to the person with BPD that he is a 
burden to those few significant others who have not abandoned him. He can see how his actions 
have affected these significant others-the horror in the face of friends who see his cutting scars; 
he has seen the panic in a lovers eyes when he threatens to kill himself if the lover ever leaves; 
he has sensed the exhaustion in the voice of a parent who in the middle of the night has to soothe 
their adult-child like an infant over the phone so he can resolve his anxiety. The feelings of 
incompetence and shame only aggravate the individual’s already excruciate experience, and 
many times people with BPD isolate themselves to avoid these experiences.  
The resulting efforts to resolve this dilemma frequently lead to what is referred to as 
splitting i.e., vacillating between idealizing and devaluing some person, event or thing, very 
rarely balancing these perceptions for a more realistic portrayal. This is the epitome of black-or-
white thinking. And splitting, as one would expect, leads to unstable interpersonal relationships. 
For example, the object of a borderline’s unrequited love may vacillate from being God’s gift, all 
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good, such that even his flaws are good, to being a villainous monster with no capacity for 
goodness at all. A boss may be first beloved as a mentor, parent-substitutes, and as a genius in 
their field, and with one misperceived glance, suddenly be thought of as fascist slave-drivers 
with a superiority complex. 
 Personality Disorders in general provide interesting grounds for discussions of 
responsibility especially since researchers typically agree that Personality Disorders are 
influenced both by hereditary influences and the early childhood environment. Borderline 
Personality Disorder is especially problematic as these individuals are prone to attack 
themselves, their significant others (friends, family, co-workers etc) and the public at large. 
Accepting personal responsibility means that individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder 
are cognitively able to sort through these behaviours to better apply the techniques taught in 
DBT, resulting in fewer attacks of self and others. It is in the best interest of the public to include 
these voices in our collective conversation in order to better learn how to alleviate suffering. In 
the chapter that follows, I will introduce Spinoza’s basic ontology, and I will show how Hasana 
Sharp’s Spinozan project of renaturalization undermines the “antinomian dialectic”. In do so, 
Sharp argues for a radically relational politics that has far reaching consequences for speech, 
ideology, social justice and, I argue, for the public’s relationship with its population of 
individuals with BPD. 
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The Ethics: Spinoza’s Basic Ontology 
 Spinoza’s aim with The Ethics was to investigate the manner of all things in the same 
fashion as one examines “lines, planes and bodies”, that is, in a rigorous geometric method of 
axioms and the propositions that follow. Spinoza is fundamentally a monist; in his system, there 
is only one Substance, God or Nature, which he defines as “that which is in itself and is 
conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of 
another thing from which it has to be formed.” (E1def3) Substance exists necessarily and is self-
caused (E1p7), infinite (E1p8), indivisible (E1p13) and the cause of all things (E1P15pr).  There 
are two aspects of Substance, a productive aspect and a produced aspect. The productive aspect, 
referred to as Natura naturans or “Nature naturing”, produces Natura naturata, or “Nature 
natured”. These two aspects are necessarily related, as Substance causes all things (Substance 
natures Nature), and therefore all things that can exist in Substance are in Substance.  
The essence of Substance can be expressed in infinitely many ways, but, Spinoza claims 
that we can only know two, namely, Extension and Thought, as we can only know the qualities 
that make up our own ideas of our particular bodies. Extension and Thought are not 
fundamentally distinct, as they are both ways of expressing the infinite Attributes of Substance, 
although they are autonomous. They are autonomous in that it would be a mistake to assume that 
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what happens in realm ofThought can affect what happens in the realm Extension, or that 
Extension can affect Thought, rather they are parallel. The appropriate characterization of the 
relationship between these Attributes becomes clear when considering the characterization of the 
expressions of Thought and Extension. 
The eternal and infinitely many Attributes of Substance are also expressible in infinitely 
many ways, and these modifications Spinoza called Modes.  There are infinitely many Modes, 
and only two ways in which they can relate to Substance: the modes can follow directly from the 
Attributes, and as such are considered infinite (for example, the laws of physics, or the principles 
of logic); or the modes can be finite due to their being more causally remote from Substance, and 
include particular bodies and ideas.lxiv Bodies are the modification of Extension, while Minds or 
Ideas are the modifications of Thought. As previously mentioned, the relationship between 
Thought and Extension is made clear through discussion of the Modes. The essence of Thought 
is the mind, and the object of study in the mind is its corresponding body. Spinoza maintains that 
our Minds and Bodies are subject to the same powers and laws of Nature, considered via the 
Attributes of Thought and Extension, respectively. (E2P7) Our mental states reflect how other 
external bodies are affecting our body; all of our thoughts coincide with the affectations of our 
particular bodies. The mind is therefore the idea of its own body; “the idea that we are is to 
thought and to other ideas what the body that we are is to extension and to other bodies.”lxv More 
specifically, the mind perceives how the body feels. At least two things follow from this: first, 
that the mind and body are governed via the same order and connection expressed either through 
Thought or Extension; and second, that when there is activity in the body, there is also activity in 
the mind, and when there is activity in the mind, there is activity in the body. This unique way of 
characterizing the relationship between the mind and the body is referred to as “parallelism”. 
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Parallelism is described by Deleuze as “one and the same modification is expressed by one mode 
under each attribute, each mode forming an individual together with the idea that represents it 
under the attribute of thought.”lxvi Bodies can only affect and be affected by bodies, and minds 
can only affect and be affected by other minds (E3P2), and this is because the mind and the body 
are strictly one and the same thing, expressed as the attribute Thought in the case of the mind, or 
as Extension in the case of the body.  
Therefore, for Spinoza, there is one Substance with two knowable Attributes (out of an 
infinite many of unknowable Attributes), Extension and Thought. All finite modifications of this 
one Substance necessarily have the same Attributes, as all things are dependent on and can be 
understood through Substance. Therefore, any particular individual mode can be appropriately 
considered as a physical thing, and as the idea of the physical thing, or an ideal thing. That is, 
Nature is made up of extended things and the awareness of those extended things. The individual 
modes are diverse and can undergo changes, but Substance nevertheless entirely determines 
these varieties and changes without itself being varied or changeable because of their 
dependence on and inherence in the one Substance. But how can one distinguish between the 
various modes? Clearly, although all modes are expressions of the power of Substance, 
individual modes are not identical. Consider, for example, a typical human individual, a mode of 
Substance that can be properly understood as both an extended and a thinking thing. The 
extended Attribute of a human individual undergoes radical changes throughout the individual’s 
life, such that most tissues in the human body replace cells several times in an average life, and 
in parallel the thinking aspects of an individual human undergo radical changes in awareness. 
Nevertheless, Spinoza maintains that there is a unique relationship between the parts that 
undergo such changes that maintains the identity of a typical human individual.  
!!
!
BB
Particular modes can be distinguished based on composite parts bordering one another 
and these composite parts exhibiting a proportion of movement unique to the overall individual. 
(E2L1) This proportion of movement is referred to as “the ratio of motion and rest.” Even though 
modal changes are continuous, an individual mode can maintain its autonomy as long as the ratio 
of motion and rest is maintained (E3L5). An external body/idea is considered to be one that has a 
different ratio of motion and rest. Individuals are constantly affecting and being affected by other 
external bodies/ideas, and when confronted, the external body /idea has the potential to increase 
the individual’s power of action, or the potential to decrease the individual’s power of action. 
Deleuze describes this process in Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy (1970):  
The object that agrees with my nature determines me to form a superior totality that 
includes us, the object and myself. The object that does not agree with me jeopardizes my 
cohesion, and tends to divide me into subsets, which, in the extreme case, enter into 
relations that are incompatible with my constitutive relation (death).lxvii 
  
Important to Spinoza’s overall thesis is the idea that no finite mode can be destroyed except by 
an external cause (E3P4). This is because the essence of every finite mode is the conatus (E3P7). 
The conatus is the tendency for individual, particular modes to strive to persevere in being. That 
is, individual modes strive to pursue other external modes, which enhance one’s power of action, 
and avoid the potentially dangerous external modes that threaten one’s survival. (E3P6) One’s 
power of action is identical with one’s capacity to be affected. (E3def3) The conatus of the mind 
is called “Desire”, and the conatus of the combination of both mind and body is called 
“Appetite”.  
There is nothing in the conatus of a particular mode that affirms finitude, only 
indefiniteness; that is, although there is nothing in the essence of a mode that entails destruction 
from an internal cause, nevertheless, there is a limit to the power of one’s striving to persist. A 
particular mode, as long as it continues to exist as itself, will continue to demonstrate its conatus 
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until another particular mode radically changes the ratio of motion and rest in the original 
particular mode, such that it can no longer be rightfully identified with its former self. If one 
were capable of destroying oneself, then, for Spinoza, this would be reflected in one’s nature. 
This is an absurdity, for one’s nature cannot contain the contrary principles of striving to survive 
and striving to self-destruct. So, for Spinoza, there are no real suicides, but only the bodies/ideas 
that have affected one’s body/mind in such a way as to corrupt one’s striving to survive. Suicidal 
motivations, then, are symptoms of one’s being affected by intense oppositional forces. For 
example, when an individual with BPD is motivated toward self-harm, Spinoza would maintain 
that this motivation cannot come from the individual. Rather, the collection of traits and 
behaviours that determine the disorder are disabling to the body and mind of the individual such 
that self-harm is the most enabling option for relief. The pain that precedes the act of self-harm is 
so intense that it prevents the individual from optimal performance. It perverts and distorts the 
individual’s perception to make self-harm the most enabling option. The forces of Nature and the 
determinations of the myriad of other beings in existence have “gummed up” the conatus 
machinery in these individuals. 
Spinoza notes that humans tend to judge something as “good” only when they strive for 
it, desire it, etcetera, and “evil” when they do not. (E3P9sch) In this way, “good” and “evil” 
serve as cognitive organizers, or “modes of thinking”, that arose from our habit of comparing 
things. (E4Preface)  However, when reconsidered as movements toward either pleasure or 
toward pain, and relabeled “the good” and “the bad”, the labels then serve as relational tools, 
expressing the effects of the bringing together of two or more bodies. (E3P39sch) For Spinoza, 
“the good” is simply when those bodies/ideas that compound with my body/idea in a way that 
corresponds to my nature and increases my power; “the bad” is characterized by the body/idea 
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encounters my body/idea in a way that does not correspond to my nature, and therefore decreases 
my power. The more complex the body the more complex the system of relations between the 
parts of the body-therefore giving rise to the possibility of one body/idea being both good and 
bad at once for one’s own body/idea in different respects.lxviii 
One of Spinoza’s goals is to renaturalize human action, human thought and human 
affectations. He argues, “Nature is always the same, and its force and power of acting is 
everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things 
happen and change from one form to another are everywhere and always the same…I shall, then, 
treat of the nature and strength of the emotions, and the mind’s power over them…just as if it 
were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies.” (E3Preface) “Emotions” refer to a mode’s 
power of action increasing or decreasing, and the idea of these affectations.  (E3def3) When a 
mental state is clearly and distinctly understood (i.e., caused by adequate ideas), and originates or 
follows directly from the nature of one’s idea of one’s own body, then the mind is considered 
“Active”.  However, the mind is “Passive” when understanding of its state is confused (i.e., 
caused by inadequate ideas), or when the state follows from the idea of an external body 
affecting the  body. (E3D2). For example, my mind is Passive if I believe that ice is simply 
thefrozen version of liquid water because of the way in which my body is affected when it 
compares the colour of liquid water and ice, and how the ice feels cold when in the palm of my 
hand. If I believed that ice is simply the frozen version of liquid water because of its identical 
chemical formula of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms for every one molecule, then my 
mind would be Active. If one learns adequate novel ideas, then a passive mind can become 
active. If a Passive mind gains adequate knowledge of the chemistry of water, and then uses this 
adequate knowledge to form one’s beliefs about water, then that mind can no longer be 
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considered Passive.  Therefore, with respect to emotions, passions are confused ideas that are 
associated with increases or decreases in one’s power of activity. There are also active emotions, 
and they are clearly and distinctly understood ideas originating from reason alone, and are 
always associated with an increase in one’s power of activity. (E3P58) As Spinoza’s examination 
of emotions plays an important role in the next section, I will now briefly review the passions. 
There are three primary passions, and from these all other passions can be derived. The 
primary passions involve changes in one’s power of activity. (E3p11) Desire, the first primary 
passion, is exactly the conatus of an individual, plus the awareness of the conatus. That is, desire 
is the striving toward that which preserves the being of its host. The second primary passion is 
pleasure, which refers to the experience of the mind moving from lesser to greater perfection, 
from less power to act to more power to act. Finally, pain is the experience of moving from a 
greater power to act to a lesser power of action. (E3P11sch) We have a tendency to promote the 
things that will lead to our pleasure, and avoid or destroy the things that we imagine will lead to 
our pain. (E3P28) As a result, we are biased toward thinking of those things that bring us 
pleasure (E3p12), and biased either against thinking of those things that bring us pain, or toward 
thinking of the destruction of those things that bring us pain. (E3P12, E3P13). With this 
understanding, the passion love is derived as pleasure, as well as the idea of some external cause; 
hate is pain combined with the idea of some external cause. (see appendix for the rest) 
Spinoza observes that passions can be so strong as to surpass one’s power of action 
completely (E4P6), but such an emotion can be overcome by a stronger contrary emotion 
(E4P7). Further, emotions are stronger when they are thought to be presently self-caused, rather 
than caused by another either in the past or the future. (E4P9, P10)  
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As we now have a description of the affects, Spinoza uses Part 4 of the Ethics to explain 
why the passions affect us as they do. In Part 4 of the Ethics, Spinoza investigates why we are 
enslaved to the callings of our passions, and why, instead, we do not use our capacity for 
reasoning to free ourselves from passions clutches. While promoting the striving to be passion-
free, Spinoza maintains that the actual achievement of this goal is likely impossible, but he 
insists that we can moderate and restrain them in order to become more active beings. 
(E3Preface) He notes that our human habit of comparison has led to the use of the labels 
“perfection/completion” and “imperfection/incompletion”, much like it led to the “Good” and 
“Evil” labels, only the comparison is between some particular thing and the general idea, or ideal 
type of the same particular thing. This habit can lead to the inadequate idea that Nature also 
holds these general ideas and ideal types, such that when something deviates from the ideal 
model, we tend to assume that Nature has failed and created an imperfection. For Spinoza, this 
assumption is clearly a fiction, “For nothing belongs to the nature of any thing except that which 
follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause; and whatever follows from the 
necessity of the nature of its efficient cause must necessarily be so.” (E4Preface) Rather that 
relying on this inadequate conception of perfection and imperfection, Spinoza advocates 
understanding perfection as the essence of a definitely existing particular thing. That is, 
perfection is that which completes the goal of increasing pleasure and the power of activity.  
Spinoza equates virtue with one’s power of action, and as such claims that reason dictates 
that we seek our own true advantage.  From this, Spinoza claims that those who commit suicide 
exemplify the consequence of being overcome completely by external forces that oppose their 
respective natures. Suicidal motives do not arise from an individual’s essence; it is impossible 
because the essence of every finite mode is to persist in being. We can never be such that we 
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need nothing outside of ourselves, and there are many advantageous relations to strive toward 
including community with similar beings. This is why we humans are the most useful to one 
another, for in joining together we can affect one another so as to be more and more powerful 
together than we ever could be individually. This motivation for increased power of activity 
leads rational individuals to seek their own advantage, while seeking nothing that they would not 
also want for the rest of humankind. (E4P18sch) From this it follows that unless overcome by 
external forces contrary to one’s nature, nobody will seek what, for them, is disadvantageous 
(E4P20sch).  
Spinoza argues that the essence of reason is ‘understanding’ and that the highest good for 
the human mind is to have adequate knowledge of God/Nature (E4P26, P27). The influence of 
the passions leads to misunderstandings and differences between individuals (E4P34), but those 
who live by the dictates of reason always necessarily agree in nature (E4P35). By virtue of this 
agreement in nature, it follows that we can be most advantageous to one another when we are 
devoted to pursuing our respective true advantages. (E4P35cor2) Regardless of our tendency for 
passionate conflict and difference of opinion, Spinoza insists that we will always come to see 
that it is only by coming together to help one another that we can more easily satisfy our 
individual and collective needs, and protect ourselves for individual and collective perils. 
(E4P35sch) Therefore, we should promote living under the guidance of reason for all human 
beings (E4P37). One can only come to this conclusion if one is operating by the dictates of 
reason. For we understand that one cannot act in a vacuum, rather we are influenced and we 
influence the other myriad of finite beings. To achieve what will promote my personal striving, I 
must admit that I require certain others to be successful in their strivings. For example, even 
though it may appear to be in my best interest to isolate myself from personalities prone to 
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attack, like those with Borderline Personality Disorder, I am best served if there are fewer 
personalities that are disordered in these troubling ways. Therefore, it is consistent with my own 
personal striving to seek to alleviate the suffering of these individuals with BPD to promote more 
enabling emotional and cognitive responses. 
If we understand that our collective force is a powerful tool for our individual and 
collective survival, then we strive to live in harmony and to help each other. In order to do this, 
however, we have to give up some of our natural rights; for example we have to refrain from 
acting in ways that could be harmful to others. In doing so, we give up our natural right for 
revenge on society at large by means of prohibitions enforced by stronger, contrary threats, 
rather than through reason alone. (E4P37sch2) Furthermore, since it is through our individual 
judgments of what is conducive to pleasure and what is conducive to pain that determines what is 
good and what is evil, the same is true for what society judges to be good and what it judges to 
be evil. That is, for Spinoza, what society considers ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are precisely those 
behaviours that are ‘pleasurable’ and ‘painful’ to society respectively. However, Spinoza again 
insists that the same is not true in Nature; for in a determined Nature there is no wrong-doing 
(E4P37sch2). Therefore, for Spinoza, “wrong-doing is therefore nothing other than 
disobedience…” and, “…in a state of nature nothing can be said to be just or unjust; this is so 
only in a civil state, where it is decided by common agreement what belongs to this or that 
man.”(E4P37sch2) One can be led to bad behaviour by the influence of one’s passions, however, 
one can also be led to the same bad behavior under the dictates of reason. (E4P59) Therefore, the 
ratio of behaviours condemned by society to things that are bad for one’s striving to persevere in 
being is not fixed, evident of the importance of the cause (internal, external, mixed) of behaviour 
when making these judgments.   
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Spinoza then provides a critical examination account of the affects: which are good, 
which are bad, which can be excessive or deficient, etc, and concludes that when met with 
hatred, anger, or contempt, the person living under the guidance of reason responds with love 
and nobility. Nobility, recall, is the striving to be a friend to and help others by the dictates of 
reason alone. So, to respond with nobility when confronted with hatred, anger or contempt 
means to respond by trying to help the person who has perpetrated the harm. (E4P46) Nor does 
the person living by the dictates of reason pity another whom they perceive as distressed, for pity 
can be paralyzing. Furthermore, the person who lives according to the dictates of reason 
understandings that all things, even events perceived as misfortunes, follow from necessity, and 
in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of Nature (E4P50sch). Spinoza comments that 
there are some who can rightfully be called inhuman, whereby the rational individual is justified 
in refusing noble assistance. Whereas, when one is known to have helped others, especially those 
perceived as misfortunate, it is rational to be disposed to benefit this helper, so as to encourage 
this kind of harmonizing behaviour in others. (E4P51) 
Spinoza defines self-contentment as the pleasure arising from one’s contemplating 
oneself, and one’s own power of activity, i.e., one’s reason. (E4P52) In virtue of the customs of 
the human social world, self-contentment is best fostered by honour: by living a life conducive to 
being praised rather than blamed. (E4P52sch) Those who experience either extreme pride, or 
extreme self-abasement are pained because they compare their own weaknesses to the strengths 
of others, and relieved from this pain when they consider the faults of others. The proud and 
those who are prone to extreme self-abasement confess their own self-ignorance (E4P55) and 
weakness of spirit (E4P56). Spinoza concludes that the proud and the self-abased are the most 
subject to emotions (E4P55cor). 
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Ultimately, Part 4 of the Ethics affirms that everything, including all human endeavors 
and desires follow from the necessity of our nature and can be understood through our nature 
alone, or, can be understood through other parts (E4Appx1), and that evil can only affect us 
insofar as we are affected by external causes (E4Appx6). Therefore, it is better for each of us to 
live in a community with residents who are in harmony with our natures, in order to best foster 
our power of activity. Without radically changing our constitutions, we cannot thrive in 
communities where people are not in harmony with our natures (E4Appx7). Spinoza insists that 
it is of primary importance that we establish harmonious relationships with one another, uniting 
together to serve to strengthen friendships (E4Appx12), even though it is not often easy to 
endure the disadvantages of living in the human social world (E4Appx14). 
In Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza considers the degree to which reason and the human mind 
can control or moderate the influence of the passions. He concludes that the human mind can 
control the emotions in five respects: first, the mind has the power to have the very knowledge of 
emotions; second, it is in our ability to detach from the emotion the idea of its external cause. 
Third, we are also able to distinguish emotions related to a superior understanding from those 
related to things we understand in a confused or fragmented way. Fourth, our mind has the 
capacity to consider the number of causes whereby those emotions flourish, which are related to 
God, or the property common to all things. Finally, the order wherein the mind can arrange its 
emotions and associate them with another demonstrates the power reason has over the passions. 
(E5P20sch) The strength of a particular emotion is determined by the comparison of the power 
of the external cause to one’s own power. Spinoza describes how distress and anxiety stem from 
one’s excessive love toward an unstable thing that one can never completely possess. He notes, 
“For nobody is disturbed or anxious about anything unless he loves it, nor do wrongs, suspicious, 
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enmities, etc., arise except from love toward things which nobody can truly possess.”(E5P20sch) 
The anxiety an individual with BPD experiences regarding his or her abandonment-engulfment 
dilemma provides a good example of this distress. On the one hand, the individual with BPD 
fears that she cannot possess her significant other, resulting in anxiety that the significant other 
will abandon the individual with BPD. On the other hand, she fears she cannot possess a stable 
self-identity, resulting in the anxiety that the significant other will engulf the individual with 
BPD. 
Sharp and the Politics of Renaturalization: 
The overall goal of the project of renaturalization is to see minds and bodies in terms of 
the complicated web of powers and counterpowers in which they are embedded, such that it no 
longer acceptable to believe that our exceptional human minds have the ability to control and 
therefore be responsible for the acts of our distracting animalistic bodies.lxix Sharp’s main 
concern in the Politics of Renaturalization is with this psychology underlying much of social and 
political thought that typically culminates in self-hatred, misanthropy and civil unrest.lxx She 
refers to this psychology as the “antinomian dialectic”. On the one hand, the antinomian dialectic 
motivates the belief that human beings are exceptional from nature, and that our capacity for 
reason, language and complex emotions belong to an exclusively human essence such that we 
are thought to be midway between the beasts and the gods. On the other hand, it can also 
motivate misanthropes to look toward nonhuman Nature as models for appropriate behaviour. 
The former push is the behind the motivation to measure ourselves against an unattainable 
normlxxi, and to believe that we have a radically free willlxxii. Descartes substance dualism is the 
grandfather of this psychology, but it remains ever-prevalent today, and can be found behind the 
majority of advertising campaign messages we are bombarded with daily. It is evident in free 
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will discourse, for example in campaigns to raise self-esteem; i.e. “Love Your Body” campaigns 
that suggest that it is absolutely in the power of the body-conscious/shamed individual to not be 
affected by the hundreds of images shown that inform us our bodies are not good enough as is. It 
pops up in environmentalist rhetoric that maintains it is our special human responsibility to repair 
the planet. Again this psychology rears its head within material for animal rights activism when 
the presense of a “proto-rational mind” of some particular creature is the reason to protect its 
rights. We hear it out in the social world when someone with distasteful behaviour is described 
as “a beast” who “ acts like an animal”, or when we plead “have some humanity!”. It is clear 
then that this attitude, no matter how philosophically problematic, has been difficult to dissipate. 
The latter concern, recall, is with the opposing extreme of rejecting human civil society and 
looking toward nature and the animals as models for appropriate behaviour. These misanthropes 
reject certain ideas and things exactly because they are human, and this leads them away from 
the Spinozistic life of reason, toward a life ruled by the variable and precarious passions. This 
aspect describes the attraction toward “uncultivated savagery precisely because it is nonhuman 
or…antihuman”lxxiii. Using Spinozist ontology of the conatus, affect and power, Sharp shows that 
humans are no less a part of nature, subject to the same determinations, cause and effect etc, and 
that the awareness of our inescapable dependency on both human and nonhuman others counters 
both aspects of the antinomian dialectic thereby resolving this self-hatred and misanthropy.  
For Spinoza, since there is nothing outside of the boundless totality of Nature, and finite 
modes of Nature are subject the natural forces and determined by cause and effect (E1p28), a 
finite mode can only exist and act if it has the power to affect (E1p36) and be affected by others 
(E1p38). Being and action are therefore inextricably tied to our relations with human and 
nonhuman others. Sharp argues that according to this interpretation of Spinoza’s ontology, 
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“…action is not an individual exercise but the consequence of an enabling affective milieu, 
comprising of infinitely many human and nonhuman forces.”lxxiv Unless we recognize that we 
are but a small part of the boundless totality of Nature, we do not have proper understanding of 
the limits of our power (E5p4), we are necessarily more subject to the influence of the passions, 
and less likely to be able to moderate them to maximize our highest advantage. Sharp argues that 
because each particular finite modes strives to persevere in existing as that particular finite mode, 
and because being is intricately tied to both human and nonhuman others, the most enabling way 
of life is one of nurturing relationships with similar finite modes.  
 Giles Simondon’s concept of “transindividuality” is central to the politics of 
renaturalization. Transindividuality is an ontogenic approach to considering what makes one 
individual distinct from others, i.e. considering the individual via the process of individuation 
(36) as opposed to considering the individual using an radically independent atomistic approach 
or as intricate parts of the whole approach. Using this ontogenic approach, it becomes clear that 
we only become “individuals” in relation to others, or more precisely from our differences when 
relating to others. (36) Thinking about individuation in this fashion renaturalizes the individual to 
emphasize that to live as in individual is to relate to other individuals. (37) This idea very clearly 
resembles Spinoza’s tripart levels of individuality (E2P13s) made up of the most basic simple 
bodies, followed by the coming together of more than one individual that are similar enough to 
form a larger meta-individual, and finally the boundless totality of Nature whose parts can be 
changed without any change to the whole. For Spinoza then too individuals can only be 
understood when considered in the context of other individual modes (E3P9). Sharp explains, 
“Being is a system of relations that is excessive, always incomplete and uncompleted, and 
perpetually differentiating.”lxxv  Since transindividuals cannot be considered independently of the 
!!
!
FE
myriad of other modes, nor from the boundless infinity of Nature, individuality is described as 
that which emerges from a “preindividual reserve from which it cannot be distinguished”lxxvi. 
The transindividual admits ‘I am only because of the myriad of human and nonhuman others 
who influence my force of being’. Affect is central to this way of considering individuality. It is 
through affect that one can determine whether or not the others encountered enhance of diminish 
ones being. Individual modes are distinguished from one another based on their relative 
complexity of both body and mind. The more complex the individual, the more it can relate to 
other modes in many ways. Recall that the conatus motivates each mode to actively pursue its 
highest advantage. It is in our highest advantage to promote and enhance our force of being, and 
since humans can be distinguished from many nonhuman others because of immense complexity 
of our bodies and minds, our power of being is intricately tied to our relations with others. It is a 
premise of Sharp’s project that unless we affirm we are parts of the boundless totality of Nature, 
we cannot understand our power or lack of power (E5p4).lxxvii Only by understanding our power 
can we inventory what reason can do to moderate the affects. The boundaries surrounding one 
individual mode are fuzzy, blurry. This is because our bodies are made up of billions of smaller 
more simple bodies, which agree with one another to such a degree that they become one 
individual. However, these composite individuals are in constant flux due to being perpetually 
relating to human and nonhuman others. Some of these relations are enabling, and some are 
disabling.  An upshot of this is that the process of individuation is really never complete, and that 
all relations are power relationslxxviii, in spite of the strivings of the conatus to maintain one’s 
distinctness among  infinitely many other singular beings.lxxix  
 Complex bodies are more able to be affected and more able to affect others, and therefore 
complex minds are more able to perceive than those minds which are not as complex. As a 
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result, the more a being is able to be affected and is able to affect, the more it is capable of acting 
(E3p13s). Human beings are distinguished from other creatures by the relative complexity of our 
bodies and of our minds. Since we are so distinguished, Spinoza argues that we are in greater 
need of others. We need others in order to determine the bodies and ideas that are enabling, and 
those that are disabling. When each human individual obeys the dictates of reason, and seeks 
their own respective advantages, it becomes clear that it is necessary to do things that are good 
for their human natures, which are the same things that are good for other humans. (e4p35d). 
This is why Spinoza maintains that “man’s greatest utility is man” (e3p18s). We humans are 
most useful to one another when we are enabled to affect and be affected in increasingly diverse 
ways that will enhance the receptive and active powers of our bodies and minds (e4p38).  
Further, it is advantageous to join together because we are not yet sure what the human body and 
the human mind can do, so, Spinoza urges that we ought to experiment. Reason dictates that to 
live best is to cherish life, friendship and to live among others in a state. (e4p73). The most 
inclusive practice of deliberation is the best, and most worthy of pursuit. However, neither 
Spinoza nor Sharp admits that the task of joining together will be easy. Sharp argues that the 
process of empowerment and engendering the liberating conditions that enable or constrain the 
passions of the whole society will be arduous and precarious.lxxx Spinoza maintains that even 
though human beings share a similar human nature in virtue of our relative corporeal similarities, 
finite modes cannot help but struggle against other opposing finite modes  (E3p6), and that 
humans are in particular naturally inclined to hate and envy (e3p55s). Still, unless we are able to 
know our power, we will be unable to determine what reason can do to moderate the affects, and 
therefore be less effective in living maximally well.  
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Community considered under the lens transindividuality is understood to be a collection 
of finite modes with enough corporeal similarity to enable effective communication and 
cooperation. Since human bodies are similar such that we can communicate and cooperate 
effectively (relative to those creature who cannot speak…not against the ideal effective 
communication and cooperation whatever that might be), Spinoza maintains that other humans 
are the most useful to the individual human striving to live well. Similar creatures are most 
useful to one another because the similar parts of their bodies share common notions, and 
therefore have the potential to enhance our agency. Sharp states, “the dictates of reason teach us 
to dedicate our energies to the preservation of any being that enhances our agency understood as 
our active and passive powers to affect and to be affected by other bodies”.lxxxi For Spinoza, 
reason refers to those ideas that are accompanied by strong feelings such that one cannot 
consider doing otherwise (E5p66). Therefore, if we are properly attending to the lessons taught 
by the affects, then we won’t be able to help but nurture our relationships with others. 
Speech, Ideology and Collective Conversation 
  Using the unpredictability of human speech as example, Sharp demonstrates how we 
benefit and why we need to come together and engage in collective conversation. Sharp 
renaturalizes speech as part of nature subject to the same natural forces and affective 
determinations just as like every other finite mode. Speech is embedded in the constellation of 
cause and effect and thereby has the power to reveal to us our respective powers to be affected 
and to affect others.lxxxii Sharp draws from Spinoza the doctrine of the unfreedom of speech. We 
are inclined to assume that speech is personal, that it comes from within/from the self, however, 
Spinoza shows that this is not true. Speech emerges from the myriad of affective relations paired 
with the relative complexity of the human body and mind (and also necessitates relations with 
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others). We only speak because we are necessarily affected by human and nonhuman others. 
Speech is not only a “citation of social practices constrained by norms and linguistic structures 
that it also produces”.lxxxiii Sharp’s project of renaturalization emphasizes the natural affective 
aspects that constrain and enable speech, especially among people who are together physically (it 
is not enough to just communicate online/telephone/correspondence). Spinoza maintains that our 
words have the power to lead to new self-awareness and can reveal our own affective characters 
and the affective character of one’s community. (E1App). So, in this way we cannot espouse a 
belief in the “freedom of speech” with respect to the will, although Spinoza in no way advocates 
for censorship. Rather, he maintains that the best method of governance is whichever permits the 
most diverse and the largest collective deliberation with respect to political freedom. Similarly, 
collective conversation reveals the affective characters of the individuals who constitute the 
community. Collective speech benefits the community by exposing “entrenched antipathies” that 
cannot be countered by the individual alone, and permits solutions to these antipathies be 
satisfactory. Learning about how we are affected and affect human and nonhuman others via 
joining together in collective conversation provides the tools to effectively manage those forces 
and determinations that negatively affect the individual or the community and therefore lead to 
more passivity, and those that promote positive affectivity the individual or the community and 
therefore lead to more active reasoning. In this way, “animation of our tongues is key to 
collective self-determination”.lxxxiv Collective deliberation brings us closer to the goal of properly 
understanding our best interests and the development of a world of “radical cooperation and 
collective striving to know and love nature”lxxxv, instead of a “world of conflict over scarce 
resources”lxxxvi.  
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 Further, the renaturalization of ideas posits ideas as the results of “a decentralized play of 
human and nonhuman forces, direct and indirect knowledge, and pleasure and strength” (67). 
Considered this way, it becomes clear that the truth of an idea does not guarantee its acceptance 
as true. Individual ideas are only measured, therefore, by their force of being and whether and 
how the idea affects others and it is for this reason that Sharp maintains that collective 
deliberation is interesting from the perspective of renaturalization. Since bodies and minds are 
not reducible to one another, and only bodies can affect bodies, only ideas can affect ideas, ideas 
are woven in a constellation of other ideas as bodies are woven in a constellation of other bodies. 
Therefore it is possible for a true idea to not be accepted as true because it is incompatible with 
the other myriad ideas in the ecosystem of ideas. Sharp states, “…no matter how clear and 
distinct [ideas] cannot take root in the mind without a fertile environment.”lxxxvii Only by 
dislocating ideas noxious to the true idea, or including ideas that are more compatible with those 
already in the web, can new true ideas be accepted as true both at an individual level, and at the 
social level. An individual may not believe some fact proven true through a series of scientific 
studies, because it does not correlate with his or her deeply entrenched religious beliefs, for 
example. At a social level, a community may not accept reports that one of its prominent 
members was involved in some illicit scandal because it does not correlate with her upstanding 
reputation. Moreover, a true idea may be rejected both personally and socially because it is 
disabling, rather than enabling to the individual or community. It might be disabling, for 
example, for an individual to accept the truth that his marriage is over/he has gotten divorced. It 
may cause paralyzing depression that prevents him from going to work, seeing friends, eating 
nutritiously etc. Because of this, the individual might continue to wear his wedding ring, and still 
refers to his ex-spouse as his “wife”. Certain groups of conspiracy theorists might be disabled, 
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for example, by accepting the truth of the human tendency for a “confirmation bias”. As before, 
in order for true ideas to be accepted as true, they must fit in to the rest of the ecosystem of ideas. 
Therefore, Sharp concludes, “that effort to think and live well requires attention to the collective 
dimensions of thinking life”.lxxxviii Collective deliberation is necessary for the optimal wellness of 
both individuals and communities. This is so because diverse and large assemblies of people 
accept diverse ideas as true. Powerful ideas are those that are shared among many minds, plus 
many minds together can think of ideas that cannot emerge from solitary meditation and it is for 
these reasons that it is enabling to join together in diverse collective deliberation. Sharp aligns 
with Spinoza in arguing that the minds of individual modes cannot even think without first 
affirming its radical dependence of other finite modes. This implies that Descartes’ famous 
pronouncement “I think therefore I am” is more accurate if tweaked to state instead that “I think 
if and only if we think”. (67, E2ax2) The public can have false but powerful ideas in the 
ecosystem of ideas, but through the dictates of reason this practice of collective conversation will 
bring more to the way of true ideas by means of sharing ideas, criticizing etc. 
 Sharp goes on to argue for nonhuman utility in Spinoza. She maintains that we ought not 
draw conclusions from the off-hand (and sexist) remarks Spinoza makes regarding the 
“womanish sentiment” underlying moral prohibitions against eating meat.lxxxix Instead, Sharp 
reaffirms that Spinoza’s remarks on nonhuman animals served as a response to the temptation to 
look toward nonhuman animals as models for appropriate human action. Spinoza’s ethics of 
similitude prompts Sharp to further investigate the political repercussions of the renaturalization 
project. These conclusions have a clear significance for the deep ecology movement, whose 
members often raise the status of nonhuman animals above humans in order to combat the 
profound damage to the planet caused by humans. Sharp continues to show the differences 
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between the accepted practice of a Hegelian politics of recognition and the Spinozist relationship 
of composition between human and non-human forces. The Hegelian politics of recognition 
suggests that humans strive to be uniquely recognized in the social sphere, whereas Spinoza’s 
politics hinges on the concept of the conatus. We are not looking to be recognized by the way we 
represent ourselves, rather, we are looking to combine with other enabling human and nonhuman 
forces, and to remove ourselves from disabling relationships. The politics of renaturalization 
have a lot to offer feminism, as evident in Sharp’s discussion of Elizabeth Grosz’s impersonal 
politics. Grosz advocates to completely abandon the master-slave dialectic prevalent in Hegel’s 
politics of recognition, which Sharp refers to as a “self-hating endeavor”xc, in favour of a politics 
of imperceptibility that “privileges acts, forces, energies, and bodies…embraces opacity, 
dissolution, indiscernibility and departicularization”.xci  Grosz’s project shares with Sharp’s the 
insistence that we are radically dependent on both human and nonhuman forces. Rather than 
women (and other marginalized groups) striving to be recognized properly as “persons” as is the 
case under the politics of recognition, the politics of imperceptibility has women striving to 
pursue alignments with compatible forces that serve to stabilize the identity of women as a 
group. The politics of renaturalization, ultimately, insist that humans are not special parts of the 
boundless totality of Nature, exempt from the determinations of cause and effect, nor are humans 
“a perversion of nature’s order”xcii. By thinking of our relationships with human and nonhuman 
others using renaturalization frame, we can significantly lower the self-hatred and misanthropy 
that disables us individually and socially. 
 Although no direct works have been written on the subject, I contend that both Spinoza 
and Sharp would agree that individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder are better served 
under the lens of a radically relational model like the politics of renaturalization, than they would 
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be served under any model that suggests that the human mind has a special status and power to 
control its instrument, the human body. Those in the medical and psychological communities are 
expected to demonstrate a certain level of objective detachment, and to refrain from making 
moral judgments about their patients. However, many people in the lay public assume that the 
problematic behaviours enacted by an individual with BPD (and most other individuals) are 
under his or her control, thus fueling stigmas that people with BPD are manipulative in that their 
melodramatic reactions are fake, and that their tendency to blame others for their personal 
behaviour is reason enough to mistrust what they say and exclude them from collective 
conversation accordingly. These perceptions examined under the mainstream lens tainted with 
residue from the antinomian dialectic might seem accurate to the lay public. ‘We aren’t animals’, 
the layperson might say, ‘we have a free will and a choice to behave humanely and civilly, even 
in the face of an emotionally-fraught situation.’ Examined, however, through the lens of the 
politics of renaturalization these stigmas lose some of their punch. When renaturalized, human 
action and thought is subject to the same determinations as the rest of Nature, and individual 
behaviours affect and are affected by the myriad of finite modes in existence. Just as Spinoza and 
Sharp emphasize the unfreedom of our tongue given the influences of our affective and social 
milieu, they too would emphasize the unfreedom of our emotional reactions, given the myriad of 
power relations in one’s milieu, especially if an individual is swayed more by the passions than 
by the active affects.  
 Therefore, I contend that Spinoza and Sharp would agree that there are some individuals 
born with inherent sensitivity; that is, there are some people who experience strong affects 
relative to the reactions of other people. Due to the myriad of forces, including but not limited to 
an emotionally invalidating or abusive childhood environment, and a social world that is not 
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prepared to meet the unmet needs of these sensitive individuals, there are individuals who are 
more prone to disable and be disabled by relations with other humans. This view of BPD is 
compatible with what the medical and psychological communities currently theorize about the 
disorder. The best theories on BPD agree that there are both elements from Nature and from 
early childhood environments that put certain emotionally vulnerable individuals at risk for 
developing the disorder. Although there is still considerable debate over the limits of personal 
control these individuals typically have over their reactions to emotionally volatile situations, the 
neuro-cognitive similarities between individuals with BPD in crisis and individuals with certain 
frontal cortex damagexciii suggests that Spinoza and Sharp are right to question the idea of a 
radically free will. 
 In the section that follows, I hope to show that given the politics of renaturalization, it is 
in the best interests of the public to abandon the antinomian dialectic that keeps the voices of 
people with BPD from being more appropriately heard and trusted, and to begin to accept the 
public and societal role and responsibility for having a population with BPD. This will benefit 
individuals with the disorder access and accrue self-knowledge, and will help to loosen their grip 
on egosyntonicity and its consequences. It can benefit the significant people in the lives of 
individuals with BPD by offering novel ideas and methods to better cooperate and relate with 
their loved one with the disorder. Finally, the public as a whole will benefit from the new 
trustworthy voices in the collective conversation, in the hopes of determining reason’s power to 
temper the passions that enable the proliferation of this disorder.  
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Chapter Three: Renaturalizing Borderline Personality Disorder 
I propose that because of our radical dependency on human and nonhuman others, it is 
our responsibility as a society to accept some of the blame for having members of our society 
who have a borderline personality disorder. , Accepting this responsibility as a society benefits 
both the individual with a borderline personality, nonclinical friends family and coworkers, and 
the society as a whole. In doing so, we renaturalize the borderline personality through an 
understanding of those conditions that have contributed to the development of borderline 
personality disorder, and determine whether and what reason can do to moderate these conditions 
to prevent the disorder from being as disabling, creating fewer disabling personalities and 
inviting more voices to our collective conversations.  
As is clear from both Sharp and Spinoza, the conatus dictates that we pursue those things 
that are advantageous to our force of being, and reject those things that are disabling to our force 
of being, and it is in our best interest to pursue enabling relationships with other humans because 
of our corporeal similarity. But what of those personality types who exceptionally struggle to 
have healthy enabling relationship with other humans? As you recall, borderline personality 
disorder is typified by markedly disturbed social relationships. What’s more is that the other 
characteristic symptoms of borderline personality disorder relate in some way to others as well as 
a result of their attempts at resolving the distressing abandonment/engulfment dilemma.  
Individuals with borderline personality disorder are prone to attack: attacking themselves, 
attacking others, and attacking the cohesion of the social system itself. Someone with BPD 
attacks himself when he engages in purposeful physical harm like cutting, but also in 
participating in lifestyles that are not conducive to a life of wellness, such as substance abuse, 
eating disorders, etc. Relationships with those with borderline personality disorder can be 
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disabling for close others for they are usually the recipients of the person’s infamous rage, 
sometimes even being subject to domestic violence. Individuals with BPD attack the cohesion of 
the system by engaging in shoplifting, pathological lying, being notoriously difficult 
psychotherapy patients therefore making it challenging to eradicate the disorder, and frequent 
uses of medical health services for mental health distresses such as panic attacks, suicidal 
ideation and attempts, and self-harm injuries.  
Keeping in mind the above considerations, it is no wonder then that as a society we have 
developed several systems to classify and manage these potentially disabling individuals, the 
most relevant to our purposes is the DSM-IV-TR. However, if we are living under the dictates of 
reason, we know that we ought to diversify our body to afford us the opportunity to affect and be 
affected by an increasing myriad of other beings, and thereby increasing our power of being. We 
know that we need as many voices in the conversation as possible so that we may better attend to 
the forces that move us to think and act, so as to modify our social worlds to afford more 
freedom.xciv So, having approximately 2 percent of the general population suffering from 
borderline personality disorder (with three times as many women as men, and commonly (though 
not necessarily) in marginalized populations) may not be as effective in the satisfaction of our 
societal conatus as we originally designed.  
In order to best learn and understand our affectations in order to determine how reason 
might moderate the affects, both Spinoza and Sharp advocate for joining together in collective 
deliberation. At present, individuals with borderline personality disorder make up a small 
percentage of the voices in our social-chorus because of their tendency to attack themselves, 
others, and the system itself. Further, the quality of credence afforded to these borderline voices 
is less than those in the nonclinical population, and even among others with mental disorder, and 
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this is no surprise when considering the characteristic features of the disorder. Borderline 
personality disorder is among the personality disorders that commonly features ‘egosyntonicity’, 
i.e the opinion that one’s symptomatic behaviour is not problematic. This can be manifest in a 
poor attitude toward seeking or staying in treatment, a pattern of making excuses for poor 
behaviour, entitlement etc. The individuals who demonstrate this attitude operate under the 
power of a false idea. Not only that, but they tend to expect significant others (friends, family, 
co-workers), or the social system itself (legal settings), to tolerate their disabling behaviours; 
they don’t accept responsibility for their actions. This attitude is at odds with those nonclinical 
others and society who tolerate and excuse poor behaviour only to an extent, and even then most 
of this generosity is afforded to those who are already privileged with high status in society. 
Affording any more tolerance threatens to undermine the both the significant other’s 
composition, and the composition of the social community. The significant other is threatened 
with emotional abuse, physical abuse, harassment etc. It need not even be as dramatic as abuse 
and harassment, however. The stress of even just losing a friend or family member with a 
Borderline Personality who severs social ties when circumstances did not unfold to his 
satisfaction can be enough to disable the significant other for an extended period of time. 
Affording more tolerance similarly threatens the composition of the whole social group as well, 
for the longer society permits the individual with BPD to misbehave without correction, the more 
harms are likely to befall its population at the hands of these personalities prone to attack. So, not 
only do these egosyntonic individuals operate under a false idea (i.e., that their symptomatic 
behaviour is not a problem), this false idea threatens to disable even those who do not have the 
disorder. This leads me to advocate for finding a way to invite individuals with BPD to engage 
and participate in the collective conversation so that the power of our true ideas can overwhelm 
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the ideas that bolster egosyntonicity so that the borderline is justifiably afforded a better quality 
and a larger quantity of space in the conversation.  
Although there is no proper cure for the disorder, there are a handful of treatments that 
have been shown to be effective in treating certain aspects of it. The best available treatment of 
these problematic symptoms, recall, is Dialectical Behaviour Therapy. Numerous studies have 
verified DBT’s empirical validityxcv and to temper any threats to significant others and to society, 
I must stress the importance of inviting into the collective deliberation more individuals with 
BPD who use the techniques taught in DBT than those who do not. Still, these individuals with 
BPD may very well still suffer from the other, less immediately physically threatening symptoms 
of the disorder, including egosyntonicity. And since the nonclinical significant other, and society 
as a whole generally has good reason to isolate or offer less testimonial credence to their 
contributions, it is perhaps too much to expect the nonclinical others to tolerate this disabling 
attitude under this lens. I aim to show that Sharp’s politics of renaturalization provides a tool to 
help egosyntonic borderlines loosen their grip on their blaming attitudes, thereby making it less 
distasteful to more fully include these personalities in the conversation. 
  Individuals with BPD are often said to be manipulative, attention-seeking, and have a 
distorted perception of events and people. Again, it is no wonder that we have classified these 
personalities as disordered, in order to protect our respective strivings toward perseverance in 
being, and to protect the conatus of our social group considered as an individual. No matter how 
natural it seems for the nonclinical population to isolate these potentially disabling individuals, 
and to afford them less testimonial validity, the project of renaturalization shows that we would 
be better off if we could carve out more of a space for these personalities to more fully 
participate in collective deliberation. As Spinoza and later Sharp affirm, each of us is 
!!
!
EI
inextricably bound to every other finite mode (E1P28), and as a result, Sharp argues that action 
cannot be considered an individual exercise. This means that even problematic behaviours 
characteristic of borderline personality disorder are the consequence of an affective milieu by 
which the behaviours are enabled.xcvi And as such, it is in the best interests of the human social 
community as a whole to include as many diverse voices in our collective conversations, that we 
might better learn about our affects. Recall that for Spinoza, and then for Sharp, it does not make 
sense to say that humans have freedom over their speech. Since we do not have conscious 
control of our tongues, our words have the power to expose our affects. Now if we can make it 
such that the dangerous individuals with BPD are less dangerous, then we can help them to be 
further included and trusted in the conversation by admitting our bounded responsibility. In 
doing so, we add more tongues revealing more of the “affects and forces that contour our 
imaginations”xcvii and hopefully leading to new revelations about and treatments for the disorder. 
Further, accepting this bounded-responsibility has the potential to inspire society to acknowledge 
that the borderline (just like everyone else) cannot make it such that they are never influence by 
their passions, no matter how much treatment they receive. Hopefully Sharp is right that this 
acknowledgment will lead to depleting the disabling power of our judgments . Our judgments in 
this regard can be disabling for us as a society, as we have fewer voices contributing to the 
conversation and fewer powerful novel (true) ideas being generated; they are disabling for the 
individual with borderline personality disorder because of the effects of self-incomprehensibility, 
and therefore being subject to the influences of the ever-changing passions. Ultimately, including 
these voices in the conversation will motivate us to change our social world into one where more 
can share in genuine freedom, “which will necessarily be a freedom of degree rather than an 
absolute power to determine ourselves”xcviii. Sharp draws from Spinoza the position that it is in 
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humanity’s best interest to have a knowledge and love of Nature that can be attained only by 
cooperating with a myriad of human and nonhuman forces (e4p36), and especially if we 
cooperate with other humans (e4p37). If accepting a societal responsibility for having a 
population afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder ultimately helps everyone (including 
the individual with Borderline Personality Disorder) develop common notions by helping 
motivate nonclinical others and society as a whole to us to cooperate more effectively with 
borderlines, and helps individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder cooperate more 
effectively with nonclinical significant others, and society as a whole, then we ought to pursue 
this stance, for it will help us to maximize our power of being. 
   Many famous participators in the collective deliberation whose voices society has 
welcomed and even celebrated are said to have had a borderline personality. For example, 
Princess Diana is said to have suffered from crippling fears of abandonment stemming from her 
when her mother left the family only to return inconsistently. She is also said to have suffered 
from bulimia, severe mood swings and increasing impulsivity and destructiveness typical of a 
borderline personality disorder.xcix  Writer Zelda Fitzgerald was hospitalized a number of times 
for her drastic changes in mood, severe bouts of depression and self-destructive impulsivity. She 
was diagnosed first with schizophrenia, then with bipolar disorder (manic depression at the 
time), until she was finally appropriately diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, a tale 
all too familiar to many with the disorder.c Author Susanna Kaysen of Girl, Interrupted fame was 
diagnosed with the disorder in the 1960s. Her insights into the phenomenology of having a 
borderline personality are indispensible, and both the memoir and the film based on the book 
brought attention to a more complete picture borderline personality disorder for the mainstream 
culture, than the image depicted by stories like Fatal Attraction and What Above Eve.  
!!
!
@C
Importantly for our purposes, Marsha Linehan, famed borderline personality disorder researcher, 
and creator of the most effective treatment, Dialectical Behavior Therapy, has come out as a 
sufferer of the disorder. Her ability to manage her distress while attending to her studies has truly 
helped not only her fellow sufferers, but personality researchers and the public at large. 
Linehan’s insights into the disorder have provided more background into what kind of early life 
environments tend to aggravate especially sensitive individuals into developing borderline 
personality disorder. And her introduction of mindfulness meditation in the traditional cognitive-
behaviour model of treatment has reduced the number of hospital admissions for treated 
individuals with BPD relative to untreated individuals with BPD. Speculative reports claim that 
Marilyn Monroe, Jim Morrison, Angelina Jolie, Amy Winehouse, among other iconic figures in 
our pop culture also fit the criteria for a diagnosis.ci  It is clear, then, that in spite of the many 
obstacles facing borderline personalities, some do manage to have their voices heard and valued, 
and it has benefitted society. Imagine, then, the benefits society might incur if more with 
borderline personality disorder were able to participate in the collective deliberation with a better 
quality and better quantity of involvement.  
These individuals are typically described from infancy as highly-reactive, or 
“hypersensitive”. Marsha Linehan refers to these individuals as “emotionally vulnerable”.cii 
Inspired by Sharp’s politics of renaturalization, I maintain that these are the individuals in nature 
who are most able to affect and be affected by the myriad of ambient forces. They are more 
affected, for example, by a more senior colleagues friendly teasing when first starting out at a 
new job than their nonclinical peer. Their anger is more likely to escalate into rage and emotional 
or physical abuse over what a nonclinical peer might consider a minor offense, like forgetting an 
important anniversary in the relationship. Often wrought with intrusive morbid thoughts or, 
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flashbacks of earlier traumas, whether incurred from early life experiences, or from self-abuse, 
borderlines may not be able to identify the trigger that so affects them (those who are especially 
disabled these thoughts and memories may develop a co-morbid general anxiety disorder, or 
refrain from social life altogether to avoid being so triggered). Now, since these individuals have 
a disordered personality it is not guaranteed that their tendency to affect and be affected by a 
myriad of others will prove to be more useful for their own wellness, nor the wellness of others 
and society. This leads me to advocate for society to accept a kind of public responsibility for 
Borderline Personality Disorder without falling prey to the criticism that in so doing the society 
has let these individuals off the hook for their misbehaviour and that their suffering cannot 
properly be considered clinically relevant. By renaturalizing the responsibility of the individual 
with Borderline Personality Disorder in society, my hope is that the otherwise problematic 
symptoms of the disorder be less disabling to the individual with BPD, to the nonclinical 
significant others, and to society at large than if the responsibility falls solely on the individual 
with the disorder. 
 However, this is only an enabling exercise for both the person with BPD, for others and 
for the social system as an individual if the person with Borderline Personality Disorder is able to 
accept responsibility for his or her own role in the demonstration of the problematic symptoms of 
the disorder, one need not come before the other. Accepting personal responsibility for 
problematic symptoms benefits the person with BPD as it is only by accepting responsibility that 
the she can begin to deprogram problematic responses to triggering situations. Hopefully, by 
beginning to deprogram these problematic responses, the individual with BPD is less likely to be 
as attack-prone as she was prior to accepting responsibility. Recognizing that even though a 
situation might trigger unwelcomed responses in her, that does not mean that the situation 
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warrants such responses may hinder the person with BPD from blaming others, and perceiving 
these others as deserving of the mistreatment associated with the unwelcomed response. So, it is 
beneficial for society that the individual with BPD can accept responsibility for herself.  
People with a borderline personality are typically expected to blame others, or hold others 
responsible for their own emotions and misdeeds. In fact, it is a major goal in treatment to have 
the patient learn to accept responsibility for their actions as it indicates a much better prognosis 
than those patients who hold a firm grip on blaming others. And it is easy to see why that is 
thought to be the case: If an individual with BPD is responsible for the damage he inflicts when 
his rage is triggered, then it stands to reason that he will be less likely to inflict such damage than 
if he was continuously not held accountable for their misbehaviour. After all, feelings of guilt or 
shame can be very disabling, especially for individuals with BPD who have shown to feel the 
“sting” of guilt and shame longer than nonclinical populations. So, it makes sense that the 
borderline would curb his appetite for destruction to avoid feeling guilty and ashamed. However, 
I don’t imagine it is common for these emotionally vulnerable individuals to be immune to 
feelings of responsibility, guilt and shame with regard to their destructive attributes prior to 
having been counseled. It is my contention that many with borderline personality disorder feel 
overwhelming feelings of personal responsibility, guilt and shame. And that these feelings are 
rooted in the myriad negative or traumatic childhood experiences ie: living in an “invalidating 
environment”, as Linehan proposes, child abuse or neglect etc, that lead to an especially 
confusing dialectic for young and vulnerable minds.  Having been taught repeatedly from their 
primary caregivers that their feelings and experiences (when expressed) do not matter, are 
incorrect (saying to a child “you like broccoli” when she is old enough to know that she does 
not), or are wrong (scolding a crying child for being sad) emotionally vulnerable children 
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develop conflicting feelings about their realities. Furthermore, in these environments there is a 
typically a high value on self-reliance, such that anytime the child fails to live up to these 
expectations from caregivers, the blame is ascribed to the child’s poor character, causing deep-
seated feelings of shame and guilt that haunt people with Borderline Personality Disorder long 
into their adulthood.  It is clear that invalidating the emotions and experiences of emotionally 
vulnerable children does not provide them the coping skills to effectively manage these strong 
emotions, and in many cases it will only further exacerbate the alleged problematic emotion. 
Later, if she has developed Borderline Personality Disorder, she is more likely to experience 
negative-emotions longer and stronger than her nonclinical peers. If she is triggered and responds 
in a rage, or a panic attack, or a depressive episode, or get madly jealous, or what-have-you, she 
is not only responding to the perceived offense, but also to the memory/thought pattern of the 
invalidating environment of her childhood years when she was caught in a conflicting reality 
where on some level she knew her emotions and experiences ought to have been considered 
valid, but the most reliable (to her pre-programmed human child mind) source of information 
about the world, her primary caregiver(s), convincingly told her otherwise. I believe that it is this 
latter response that sometimes confuses the individual with BPD into blaming “the other” in the 
situation that triggered the strong emotional reactivity, even though “ the other” may not be the 
Invalidator from her childhood and therefore the response may be inappropriate to the situation. 
The person with BPD is used to having to defend her emotions and experiences, if not out-loud 
toward her Invalidator, at least to herself, at least some of the time. And when under the heat of a 
particularly affecting emotional experience, she assumes her interlocutor will invalidate or 
discredit her complaints as her Invalidator has. Of course, I do not expect that this process is 
happening on a conscious level, or at least not on a level that the individual with BPD can readily 
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access when under the influence of high emotionality, but I think that when renaturalized in this 
way, we can see how an individual with BPD feels the urge to blame others for their own 
misdeeds, or negative experiences.  
The situation is only more clearly exposed if there has been child abuse or neglect in the 
history of a person with borderline personality disorder. For it may be clear to the child at some 
time in her developmental history that something is wrong with the way that she is being treated, 
or that other children are treated differently by their caregivers, some indication that she is being 
treated differently plus (at least a) hint of negative connotation. That is to say, on some level, the 
child knows that her actions do not warrant the kinds of treatment afforded to her by her abuser. 
However, it is in the nature of developing minds to believe adults are models for appropriate 
human behaviour, and so, especially after repeated abuses, the emotionally vulnerable child 
might finally be convinced (on some level) that she deserves to be abused. Even after 
psychotherapeutic intervention, these deep-rooted beliefs can continue to negatively influence 
the lives of the emotionally vulnerable, and especially if these vulnerabilities manifest into 
borderline personality disorder, then the individual is likely to experience the struggle of both 
feeling deserving of mistreatment and abuse, and knowing that she is not deserving of 
mistreatment and abuse. Then, later as an adult, when some event triggers a strong negative 
emotional response, not only is the individual with BPD reacting to the perceived offense, but 
also to feeling deserving of the abuses suffered as a child. And again, either her interlocutor, or 
whomever she blames stands as a surrogate for this feeling of deserving. 
On some level they are right, they are not completely at fault for their misdeeds. In saying 
that, note that I am commited to the position that everybody ought to take responsibility for the 
movements of their respective bodies, even if the movement is not intentional in the standard 
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philosophical sense of the term. For example, imagine someone drinking red wine at his boss’s 
house during a dinner party. Now imagine that person drops the glass of red wine on a very 
expensive chic area rug, staining it permanently and effectively ruining it. If he dropped the glass 
of red wine on the rug because he was envious that his boss was able to afford such nice floor 
coverings while he had to walk on cheap linoleum floor at home, he would be just as responsible 
as he would be if he had dropped the glass of red wine because he was having an epileptic 
seizure and temporarily lost motor control. Mercy, excusing, not attributing blame etc. comes 
into the play on the social response side of this equation, not on the part of the transgressor. That 
is to say, it is up to the boss whether or not she corrects this treatment by her employee. Most 
people feel mercy for someone who has temporarily lost motor control, regardless of damage 
done to fancy floor pieces, and would not offer the same mercy toward someone who damaged 
the area rug because of envy, but that does not make the envious person any more or less 
responsible than the epileptic. Someone could reply that whether mercy is appropriate depends 
on the facts about the transgressor. It might seem that the epileptic is more appropriately excused 
for the ruined rug, but I maintain that this is up for debate. The evaluation whether or not to show 
mercy comes only assuming the transgressor accepts, or is entitled to accept, personal 
responsibility for the movements of one’s own body. Socially, we want to know more about the 
transgressor in order to determine whether mercy is appropriate. If the transgressor does not and 
is not entitled to accepted personal responsibility, then we are not socially entitled to offer 
mercy. Mercy and correction, on this view, are responses to beliefs that the transgressor is 
personally responsible for the movements of her body. The transgressor might negotiate 
differently, arguing that he or she is ought not to accept personal responsibility, but the important 
point is first responsibility is assumed, and only afterward is mercy or correction delivered. 
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 So, no matter what, the individual with Borderline Personality Disorder is responsible 
for the movements of her body-if she scratches her ex-partner’s car with her keys as a response 
to the ex-partner’s new relationship, it is her fault, not her ex-partner, not the ex-partner’s new 
partner. However, it is not entirely her fault that she has developed Borderline Personality 
Disorder and has these strong reactions. Some of it might be in her genes, or in her makeup of 
her brain, some of it might be moral-failings on her part (just because she has Borderline 
Personality Disorder does not mean she is automatically a morally bad person, nor does it mean 
she is automatically a morally good person)ciii. But much of the responsibility, or fault, belongs 
in the social sphere: both from the invalidating or abusive environments they were exposed to as 
children and from the fact that these individuals were not effectively taught appropriate coping 
mechanisms for these conflicting realities (deserving/not deserving) and strong emotional 
reactions. At this macroscopic perspective, that we have allowed so many personalities in our 
social environments to become disordered shows that we are not doing enough to provide the 
tools and comforts needed for emotionally vulnerable individuals to develop such that they are 
able to participate fully in our world. The problem is that social efforts to correct abuses that take 
place in a family home are confined to legally clear cases of abuse or neglect, and even in the 
best jurisdictions, governmentally funded homecare for wards of the Crown/state fail to meet the 
exhausting needs of the emotionally vulnerable child, in spite of even the best efforts of their 
guardians. In the absence of a legally clear case of abuse or neglect, emotionally vulnerable 
children have only their peers and other adults like teachers, coaches etc. to look toward for 
emotional validation, and stability. But since primary caregivers hold epistemic priority in the 
developing child’s mind, at least with regard to the moral status of one’s character (whether one 
is a “good girl” or “good boy” etc), the lessons learned from peers and teachers may fail to fully 
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convince the emotionally vulnerable child otherwise.  Apart from urging other philosophers to 
consider foster parenting, and/or urging others to take a more active role in modeling appropriate 
responses around these at-risk children, and of course taking action to treat one’s own disordered 
personality prior to parenting children, there is little I can suggest in terms of preventing 
personalities from becoming disordered. But once the emotionally vulnerable child develops into 
an adult with Borderline Personality Disorder, it is our responsibility, at a social level, to admit 
our blame in its development. Accepting this responsibility may help those with Borderline 
Personality Disorder who stubbornly blame someone else for their own misdeeds, but only if it is 
accepted in an appropriate proportion to what is warranted. Similarly, it may help those with 
BPD who have accepted responsibility for their behaviours but continue to have the Borderline 
diagnosis, or those whose BPD has remitted but who still suffer from Borderline traits (that is, 
they no longer display five of the nine symptoms of BPD according to the DSM, but they still 
suffer from, say, fears of abandonment, or they are still prone to mood swings).  
Accepting this public responsibility at a social level can help those with Borderline 
Personality Disorder by resolving the discomfort of self-incomprehensibility. George Graham 
describes the effects of this discomfort in What Makes Mental Disorder Undesirable from The 
Philosophy of Mental Disorders: “Being in the dark about ones own person means that an 
individual is incapable of rational self-scrutiny or taking proper responsibility for self”.civ 
Whether the individual with BPD assumes complete responsibility for their disordered 
personality, or the individual with BPD assumes significant others, or society itself is completely 
responsible for their disordered personality, she is in the dark about her own person. If we 
consider borderline personality disorder under the lens of renaturalization, it becomes clear that 
the borderline personality is properly the result of an individual being especially able to be 
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affected by others (hypersensitive), especially able to affect others (for better or for worse), as 
well as having been forced to endure disabling relationships during formative years (whether 
through emotionally invalidating environments as suggested by Linehan, or more sever 
emotional and physical abuses endured). When afforded this understanding, that is, when the 
borderline has renaturalized her own self, she is no longer “in the dark” about her person, and is 
then more able to manage her especially problematic passions under the guidance of reason. She 
is more able, for example, to loosen her grip on her egosyntonic attitude, accept her share of the 
responsibility for the disorder, and ideally limit those behaviours that are disabling to herself, to 
nonclinical significant others and to society. I do not imagine that this will be an instant 
occurrence. However, by gaining more self-knowledge, the individual with BPD will be better 
able to focus on the aspects that are treatable, or else empower the individual to better manage 
their behaviours.  
 Although DBT is the most effective treatment for BPD, it does not directly address the 
topic of societal responsibility, and it is my hypothesis that this is a contributing factor as to why 
DBT does not diminish the occurrence nor the suffering of other problematic, but not necessarily 
symptoms needing immediate medical attention. Graham argues that mental disorders are not 
“excised or extirpated from a person’s psychological makeup or economy just by mere additions 
of other psychological resources…Unless the disorder itself is addressed and its ‘gum’ removed 
by means that are proper to a conditions content and character, a disorder gets in the way of a 
person with the condition. It makes their life worse.”cv This explains why the borderline does not 
suddenly, for example, resolve their crippling abandonment/engulfment dilemma just by being 
endowed with mindfulness meditation techniques taught in DBT. If we consider the content and 
character of Borderline Personality Disorder, it is clear that the “gum” of the disorder not only 
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includes behaviours that affect the person with BPD, but also social behaviours. So, if DBT only 
focuses on the personal behaviours of these individuals, then it is neglecting to address and 
remove the society’s share of the “gum”, and this is a reason why it fails to treat the other, less 
immediately medically relevant, but still problematic symptoms of the disorder. Similarly, unless 
the societal aspect of personality disorders itself is addressed and its gum removed, BPD will 
“get in the way” of our society with its population of people with the disorder. That is, until we 
address the ways in which society is responsible for Borderline Personality Disorder, BPD will 
prevent our society from reaching its highest advantage. 
  Once again I want to note that I do not endorse a view that suggests only society needs 
treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder. Although I agree with the idea that society 
generatse psychopathology and needs correction, I disagree with Charland’s commitment that 
mental disorders, especially personality disorders, are only moral problems with no clinical 
relevance. Charland maintains that the language describing the Cluster B Personality Disorders 
(ASPD, BPD, HPD, NPD), invoke explicit moral language and terminology, while the language 
describing the other Clusters do not.cvi The individuals who suffer from these social ills as people 
with BPD need help and correction as well. They are also clinically relevant because, for 
example, these individuals are more likely to suffer from autoimmune disorders like chronic 
fatigue syndrome, Crohn’s disease and allergies,cvii and are more likely to get migraines, stomach 
pains, back pain, IBS, accident-prone. Whether organic or brought on by stressful early life 
experiences that have caused chronic stress responses in the neurological system that in turn 
create physical disturbances in the body, these individuals likely use the health services more 
often and with less success than they would have if they did not develop the disorder. Under the 
project of renaturalization, a borderline individual’s physical complaints and idiosyncratic 
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syndromes common to those with BPD are not so surprising. Recall that for Spinoza the mind is 
simply the idea of the body, and the body is simply the subject of the mind. If an individual with 
BPD is in psychological distress, or if her brain is such that it tends to show more signs of 
chronic stress than nonclinical peers, then it is not surprising that her body would also show 
signs of chronic stress-such as a lowered immune response-which could lead to the development 
of an autoimmune disorder thought to be related to these idiosyncratic syndromes. If the body is 
under chronic stress, then it is no wonder why the mind of a borderline personality would show 
signs of chronic stress too via anxious obsessive intruding thoughts and the behaviours that these 
thoughts trigger. So, even apart from the clearly medical emergencies more frequently associated 
with BPD, people with BPD frequent their doctors offices more and complain more of chronic 
physical discomfort. As children many who later developed BPD frequented the doctors office-
often starting with complaints of chronic colic and chronic ear infections in infancy, and these 
maladies seem to follow the borderline personality throughout life. These people then clog up the 
medical system, or else resort to self-medicating in self-destructive ways such as substance 
abuse. So, even if someone with BPD wouldn’t have gone in for treatment for, say her feelings 
of emptiness, it is not accurate to correct only the social ills that have contributed to the disorder, 
for the person with the disorder has a great deal of clinical relevance. Unlike Charland, I 
maintain that successful treatment of the disorder does not come down to the disordered person’s 
moral conversion alone.cviii In order to have a treatment that effectively deals with the character 
and content of the disorder, we need to acknowledge the role mental health professional have in 
managing the physical complaints of those with BPD.  
 Individuals with BPD are also prone to be hypochondriacscix, and that also leads them to 
frequently use medical health services. Not only that, but a certain masochistic joy sometimes 
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arises in individuals in the throes of a disabling episode of certain mental disorders, including 
borderline personality disorder, but also evident in people with major depressive disorder, and 
bipolar disorder. It is truly the madness of mental disorder, for it goes against one’s conatus to 
strive toward behaviours and events that are disabling, but even this madness is made more clear 
when examined using renaturalization. When people are suffering from psychological disorder, 
they are under the crux of a dilemma: on the one hand they have the urge to recover, to feel well 
etc, but on the other hand they have a disorder that urges them to indulge in their problematic 
symptoms (for example, staying in bed all day instead of engaging with the world during a 
depressive episode). For much of the life of a disorder the person wrestles with this dilemma, 
ever trying to convince herself (and is being convinced by psychotherapists etc) to be influenced 
only by her striving for wellness. There are some points in the life of a disorder when the urge 
toward madness becomes stronger than ever before. That is to say, there are some moments 
when, though legitimately suffering, the disordered person finds a perverse kind of pleasure in 
indulging those problematic urges. This is no doubt the “madness” of mental disorder. 
Philosopher Louis Charland discusses a similar phenomenon seen in individuals with Borderline 
Personality Disorder called the “looping effect” (adopted from Hacking). The looping effect 
refers to a phenomenon where the identity of the individual becomes increasingly defined by and 
inextricably intertwined with their diagnosis.cx People described a certain way tend to conform to 
the ways they are described.  Charland attributes it to the fact that these individuals have 
notoriously unstable identities, so that when they are diagnosed with BPD, they take that identity 
and milk it for everything that it is worth-via online forums, chatrooms etc.  Not only does this 
madness aspect lead to clogs in the mental health system, for it keeps these individuals disabled 
when they would otherwise be able to work toward wellness, but it is also no doubt behind some 
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of the reasons those with the disorder are not afforded as much trust in the collective deliberation 
than their nonclinical peers, for we are much less tolerant of the problematic symptoms 
demonstrated if we suspect she masochistically enjoys her suffering. 
 Often another source of the negative treatment individuals with BPD are more likely to 
receive in the social world (even in the health system) stems from the belief that they know what 
they are doing-that they have agency over their actions and are therefore responsible for their 
actions. They are referred to as manipulative, attention-seeking, and are sometimes even as 
faking their distress. This is largely because it does not seem right to say that someone with bpd 
was accidently impulsively destructive: that they accidently cut their wrists, or accidently struck 
their girlfriend, etc. And if they did not do it accidently, then they must know what they are 
doing, and they must have control over their actions, or at least be held to that standard like 
everybody else. Or else, the intensity and duration of destructive emotional outbursts seems so 
disproportionate to the triggering-situation that it makes live the belief that these individuals 
must be trying to manipulate others. It might seem, for example, that if an individual with the 
disorder has a panic attack the day his partner is travelling for a weekend on business, this is a 
manipulation to convince the partner not to go on his business trip. In my opinion, it does not 
pragmatically matter in effect whether or not the he is consciously using an emotional outburst, 
or appears to be impulsively destructive in order to manipulate others. Either the outburst works 
to give hum whatever it is (he thinks) he needs, or it does not. If it does work, and say his partner 
says he will stay home to take care of his panicking partner and skip the business trip, the 
movements of the panicking partner’s body would have triggered a real panic attack that is not 
immediately resolvable as borderlines experience negative emotions longer and stronger than 
their nonclinical peers. I hypothesize that it is not likely that an individual with BPD can truly 
!!
!
GB
fake their symptoms without triggering them for real. To be convincing, the manipulation would 
have to resemble the real experience, which includes the abandonment/engulfment dialectic, 
identity disturbances, anxiety and the other characteristic borderline traits.  Once brought to 
mind, regardless of intention, they become influential, and if the individual with BPD tends to 
respond to these influences with an emotional outburst, then he will be especially likely to 
respond with a panic or emotional outburst. So, even if he starts out “faking it”, the emotional 
outburst likely becomes real. But, if the manipulation outburst gives the individual with BPD 
what he (thinks he) needs, but then it becomes an authentic emotional outburst, he (and his 
interlocutor) are really stuck. After being offered a resolution to what was initially the problem, 
how might the borderline soothe himself, or be comforted if evidence of a problem continues to 
be disabling? If it does not give him what he (thinks he) needs, then it has the potential to spiral 
into a deeper, more “authentic” emotional outburst.  
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Conclusion: 
We have established that it is in the best interests of society to accept our share of 
responsibility in having a population afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder in order to 
continue to enable diverse voices to more fully participate in collective conversation by freeing 
the borderline of her defensive grip on egosyntonic attitudes and tendency to blame others (both 
significant others and society at large) for her own symptomatic behaviours.  In so doing, it is my 
hope that these individuals be more likely to accept their personal share of the responsibility in 
demonstrating problematic symptoms of the disorder. Whereas once the individual with 
Borderline Personality Disorder was disabled by the idea that she ought be held accountable for 
her actions, it is my hope that after renaturalizing our own societal share of the blame, she be 
enabled by her own personal responsibility. Armed with this new information and understanding 
about societal contributors to her own behaviours and emotions, the individual with Borderline 
Personality Disorder is better able to determine whether and how reason might temper her 
disabling affects. The individual with Borderline Personality Disorder is also better able to 
contribute to the collective conversation by sharing her discoveries with other borderline 
individuals (more contributors like Marsha Linehan), devoting efforts to mitigate some of the 
societal harms that contribute, directly or indirectly, to mental disorder (for example participating 
in Anti-Prison activism, Feminist efforts, Anti-Imperialist movements etc), even in simply 
making an even more educated effort to prevent making the same contributing mistakes himself 
as a role model for younger humans.  
 What is the role of philosophers in this exercise? What might this accepting societal 
responsibility look like? Philosophers might play a special role in this endeavor to include more 
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borderline voices in the conversation by lending critical thinking expertise to help clarify, 
analyze and disseminate, whether academically or in the public forum, the new ideas formed. 
This way, getting the message across that individuals with the disorder have trustworthy voices 
and valuable contributions. An admittedly loftier role for the philosopher may be in treatment, as 
a deep and critically thinking peer with whom the individual with BPD (our ideal individual with 
BPD, who has benefitted from our accepting responsibility in the ways I have imagined) might 
converse about existential concerns, for example, without having to worry about raising any red-
flags for suicidal ideation. Similarly to discuss in greater detail the societal contributors to 
developing personality disorders without having to take time away from the beneficial, more 
individual-focused psychotherapeutic treatments such as DBT. Therefore, philosophers 
potentially have a unique role in this project of renaturalizing the responsibility for Borderline 
Personality Disorder, thereby enlarging our community of speakers.  
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When one cannot trace the cause of one’s love or hate, then the passions are called 
sympathy (in the former case) and antipathy (in the latter).  (E3P13sch) As our bodies are 
complex, and the ideas of our bodies are likewise complex, it is not surprising that there are 
sometimes things that arouse both love and hatred in us at one and the same time. This 
vacillation between these conflicting emotions is called doubt. (E3P17sch) Hope is related to 
doubt, and is defined as the inconstant pleasure arising from an idea of something whose 
outcome we doubt. Confidence is considered a certain pleasure arising from the thing for which 
we had previously had hope. When we experience pleasure from the idea of something whose 
outcome we had once doubted, we experience joy. Fear, (or perhaps Anxiety is more apt a 
term), like hope, arises from the idea of something whose outcome we doubt; only instead of 
pleasure, one experiences pain. Despair refers to the pain arising from the once feared thing, and 
disappointment refers to the pain arising from the idea of a thing whose outcome we once 
doubted. (E3P18sch2) 
What about the passions aroused when we compare ourselves to others for whom we are 
similar? When considering the similarities between the subjects especially, if we have the idea 
that someone is experiencing some kind of emotion, we will tend to also experience a similar 
emotion in ourselves. This is because our mind has our body as its object, and so when we 
imagine someone like ourselves experiencing some affect, then by virtue of imagined similarity, 
the idea also involves the idea of our own body (E3P27). We pity when someone who, we 
imagine, is similar to ourselves in some respect, is hurt, and we empathetically experience a 
similar hurt in ourselves. When we experience pleasure because someone we imagine is like 
ourselves has experienced pleasure, we experience the opposite of pity, but Spinoza confesses he 
does not know what its proper term. Benevolence refers to one’s striving to bring about pleasure 
in those for whom we have pitied. We approve of those who have benefitted others like 
ourselves when we experience love for these individuals.  Whereas we feel indignant toward 
those we hate for injuring someone for whom we share some important similarity. (P22sch) 
When someone finds pleasure in another’s pain, or when someone experiences pain in another’s 
pleasure, one is called envious. (E3P24sch) Spinoza refers to pride as a kind of madness 
(E3P26sch). Pride occurs when one experiences pleasure because one has a high opinion of 
oneself. Over-esteem occurs when the high opinion one holds is of another person, and when 
one holds too vicious an opinion of someone else, and simultaneously experiences pleasure at 
that fact, one is called disparaging. (E3P26sch)  Jealousy occurs when one perceives the object 
of one’s love as sharing an equal or deeper bond with another. One experiences both the passions 
of love and hate toward the object of one’s love, and experiences envy of one’s rival. (E3P35sch) 
When the object of our love is absent, we experience the passion of longing. (E3P36sch) 
When we strive toward a particular thing simply because we imagine similar others to 
desire the same thing, it is referred to as an experience of emulation. When we so desire to 
something strictly with the goal of pleasing others, especially when we are willing to behave in 
ways that promote our own pain to reach this end, the passion is called ambition. However, 
when one happens to behave in ways that are pleasing to others, but does not do so with that 
particular aim as a goal, then the passion is called kindliness. (E3P29sch) When one imagines 
one has behaved in a manner that affects others with pleasure, with the idea of oneself as a cause 
of the pleasure, one is also affected with pleasure. Likewise, if one imagines one has behaved in 
a manner that affects others with pain, combined with the idea that one is the cause of the pain, 
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then one will also experience pain. (E3P30) And, when we experience that someone has behaved 
with the aim of pleasing us, we feel praise. If we imagine, instead, that someone has behaved in 
a way that we find displeasing, we experience pain, and then blame the one who has displeased 
us. (P29sch) When one imagines being praised for some event where others experienced pleasure 
due to one’s behaviour, and one feels pleasure as a result, then one is feeling honour. Whereas 
the related experience of self-contentment occurs when the pleasure is associated with an 
internal cause, i.e., praising oneself for some event. Shame is experienced due to the pain caused 
from one’s belief that one is blamed for some event that has caused others pain. When this pain 
is related to an internal cause, that is, when one blames and shames oneself, then one is feeling 
repentance. (E3P30sch) The pain one experiences when one is blamed combined with the idea 
of one’s own impotence arouses humility, whereas the pleasure that arises from being praised 
combined with the idea of our power of activity is called self-love. (E3P55sch) 
When we refrain from behaving as we desire as a result of fearing a greater evil, or when, 
for the same reason, we choose to behave in ways that are exactly against our desires, we are 
called timid. When the greater evil feared is the fear of being disgraced, then the timidity is more 
properly referred to as bashfulness. In cases where the evil being avoided is equally as great as 
another applicable evil, such that one cannot know what choice to make, then the passion 
experienced is called consternation. (E3P39sch) 
 Anger is the experience of the desire to inflict injury on someone we hate, and revenge is 
the striving to return injury to one who had previously hurt us. (E3P40sch2) When we experience 
the striving toward benefitting someone who had benefitted us, we experience a kind of 
reciprocal love and call it gratitude.(E3P41sch) When we imagine that someone loves us, but 
this person arouses hatred within us, despite the typical tendency to love those who love us, then 
we are cruel. (E3P41sch2) Hatred can be quashed by love, or grow into a third hatred if one’s 
hatred is met by another’s. (E3P43) 
 Wonder is the affection of the mind such that one has an idea of something that “alone 
engages the mind”, that is, an idea that is not associated with any previously held idea. When we 
wonder at the pleasing qualities and characteristics of another to the extent that we imagine that 
the other surpasses us, it is called veneration. When we venerate someone that we also feel love 
for, then it is more properly called devotion. But, if the wonder is over another’s displeasing 
qualities and characteristics (such as anger, pride etc), then the wonder is more specifically 
referred to as horror. The opposite of wonder is contempt, and occurs when an object for which 
on previously felt wonder, upon closer inspection, is discovered not to possess that quality that 
aroused the feeling of wonder within us. As a result of this process, one’s mind cannot help but 
focus on the qualities that the object lacks, rather than the qualities it possesses. When we 
experience contempt toward something because it possesses a quality that we hate or are afraid 
of, then the contempt is more accurately called derision. Scorn arises when we experience 
contempt at another’s evil, and when we regard ourselves as far surpassing this other.   
 The active emotions also derive from desire and pleasure, but never from pain. (E3P58) 
These emotions are aroused by the dictates of reason alone, and only promote the continued 
striving of the individual who feels them. Spinoza refers to these emotions as illustrations of 
one’s strength of mind (E3P59sch). Courage is the striving to preserve one’s own being 
according to reason alone, and nobility is the striving to assist others based solely on the 
recommendations of reason.  
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